active? was only checked at the password step of sign-in. A user disabled afterwards could (a) still complete the 2FA step and mint a valid session, and (b) keep using any existing session until natural expiry, because per-request auth only checked session expiry, not user status. Three enforcement points: - Mid-flow guard: verify_totp and webauthn_verify re-check active? before start_new_session_for, clearing the pending session and rejecting if disabled. - Request-time guard: find_session_by_cookie now uses Session.for_active_user, so a session whose user is disabled no longer authenticates (authoritative, catches any disable path including direct DB changes). - Immediate cleanup: User#revoke_sessions_when_deactivated destroys a user's sessions when status changes away from active, so access is revoked everywhere at once rather than on the next request. Tests cover the mid-flow TOTP rejection, request-time rejection of an existing session after disable, session destruction on disable, and that unrelated updates leave sessions intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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