Dan MilneandClaude Opus 4.8
7149b98b7b
Adds three OAuth surfaces to the OIDC provider so CLIs, terminal agents, and MCP connectors can authenticate as real users instead of using static API keys. Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628): - OidcDeviceCode model (HMAC device_code, short plaintext user_code, nullable user until approval, slow_down polling state), mirroring OidcAuthorizationCode - POST /oauth/device_authorization issues the code pair + verification URIs - device_code grant on /oauth/token returns authorization_pending / slow_down / access_denied / expired_token, then the standard token triple; single-use - Authenticated /device approval page, gated by Application#user_allowed? Token Introspection (RFC 7662): - POST /oauth/introspect: confidential-caller-authenticated; returns active, scope, and the user's groups so resource servers can authorize on membership Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591): - POST /oauth/register creates public/confidential clients (PKCE required) - Runtime toggle via a new Setting store + admin switch on the Applications page; off by default, env var CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED as bootstrap fallback - New clients are default-deny (no allowed_groups) until an admin grants access - RFC 8414 metadata alias at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server; registration_endpoint advertised only while the window is open Discovery advertises all three grants/endpoints. Seeds add a clinch-cli public client and a c2a2-introspection confidential client. ADRs in docs/decisions record the opaque-vs-JWT, device-flow, and DCR-security decisions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq
51 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
51 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# 0002 — CLI/agent auth via the Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628)
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**Status:** Accepted · **Date:** 2026-07-19
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## Decision
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CLIs and terminal agents (e.g. Claude) authenticate to Clinch-protected services as a
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real user via the **OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628)** instead of static
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API keys. The tool prints a short code and a URL; the user approves at `/device` with
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their passkey; the tool polls the token endpoint and receives the standard
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access + refresh + ID token triple.
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## Context
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We wanted CLIs — and especially headless agents — to authenticate as a real user rather
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than carry a long-lived API key. The two mainstream options:
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- **Device flow (RFC 8628):** tool prints a code, human approves on any device, tool
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polls. Needs only "print text" + "poll HTTP".
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- **Auth code + PKCE with a loopback (`127.0.0.1`) redirect (RFC 8252):** tool opens a
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browser and catches a local redirect.
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Agents are often sandboxed or run on a remote box where opening a browser and receiving a
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loopback redirect is unreliable. Device flow needs neither, which is exactly why it fits
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CLIs and agents. The human approves wherever their passkey lives.
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## Implementation notes
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- `OidcDeviceCode` mirrors `OidcAuthorizationCode`: opaque `device_code` stored as an
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HMAC, short plaintext `user_code`, nullable `user` until approval, `status`
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(pending/approved/denied), PKCE columns, and `interval`/`last_polled_at` for
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`slow_down` enforcement.
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- Endpoints: `POST /oauth/device_authorization`, the
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`urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code` branch of `POST /oauth/token`, and the
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authenticated verification page `GET/POST /device`.
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- Token issuance reuses the authorization-code path (`OidcAccessToken` +
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`OidcRefreshToken` + `OidcJwtService`). Access control reuses
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`Application#user_allowed?`, so approval is gated by group membership.
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- PKCE is **optional** for device flow (RFC 8628 §5.5): enforced only when the device
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authorization request supplied a `code_challenge`. The `device_code` itself is a
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high-entropy secret delivered directly to the client over TLS.
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- A well-known public client `clinch-cli` (no secret, PKCE) is seeded for tools to use.
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## Consequences
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- No static API keys for user-context CLI/agent access; tokens are revocable and expire.
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- Resource servers validate the resulting opaque access tokens via introspection — see
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[0001](0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md).
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- Same foundation (public clients + PKCE + introspection) supports future MCP connector
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support, whose main additional piece would be Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591).
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