9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dan Milne
e631f606e7 Better error messages
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2026-01-03 12:29:27 +11:00
Dan Milne
f4a697ae9b More OpenID Conformance test fixes - work with POST, correct auth code character set, correct no-store cache headers 2026-01-03 12:28:43 +11:00
Dan Milne
16e34ffaf0 Updates for oidc conformance 2026-01-03 10:11:10 +11:00
Dan Milne
0bb84f08d6 OpenID conformance test: we get a warning for not having a value for every claim. But we can explictly list support claims. Nothing we can do about a warning in the complience.
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2026-01-02 16:35:12 +11:00
Dan Milne
182682024d OpenID Conformance: Include all required scopes when profile is requested, even if they're empty
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2026-01-02 15:47:40 +11:00
Dan Milne
b517ebe809 OpenID conformance test: Allow posting the access token in the body for userinfo endpoint
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2026-01-02 15:41:07 +11:00
Dan Milne
dd8bd15a76 CSRF issue with API endpoint
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2026-01-02 15:29:34 +11:00
Dan Milne
f67a73821c OpenID Conformance: user info endpoint should support get and post requets, not just get
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2026-01-02 15:26:39 +11:00
Dan Milne
b09ddf6db5 OpenID Conformance: We need to return to the redirect_uri in the case of errors.
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2026-01-02 15:12:55 +11:00
12 changed files with 559 additions and 89 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
# Clinch
## Position and Control for your Authentication
> [!NOTE]
> This software is experimental. If you'd like to try it out, find bugs, security flaws and improvements, please do.
> This software is experimental. If you'd like to try it out, find bugs, security flaws and improvements, please do.
We do these things not because they're easy, but because we thought they'd be easy.
**A lightweight, self-hosted identity & SSO / IpD portal**

View File

@@ -52,12 +52,24 @@ module Authentication
# Extract root domain for cross-subdomain cookies (required for forward auth)
domain = extract_root_domain(request.host)
cookie_options = {
value: session.id,
httponly: true,
same_site: :lax,
secure: Rails.env.production?
}
# Set cookie options based on environment
# Production: Use SameSite=None to allow cross-site cookies (needed for OIDC conformance testing)
# Development: Use SameSite=Lax since HTTPS might not be available
cookie_options = if Rails.env.production?
{
value: session.id,
httponly: true,
same_site: :none, # Allow cross-site cookies for OIDC testing
secure: true # Required for SameSite=None
}
else
{
value: session.id,
httponly: true,
same_site: :lax,
secure: false
}
end
# Set domain for cross-subdomain authentication if we can extract it
cookie_options[:domain] = domain if domain.present?

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
class OidcController < ApplicationController
# Discovery and JWKS endpoints are public
allow_unauthenticated_access only: [:discovery, :jwks, :token, :revoke, :userinfo, :logout]
skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:token, :revoke, :logout]
# authorize is also unauthenticated to handle prompt=none and prompt=login specially
allow_unauthenticated_access only: [:discovery, :jwks, :token, :revoke, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize]
skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:token, :revoke, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize, :consent]
# Rate limiting to prevent brute force and abuse
rate_limit to: 60, within: 1.minute, only: [:token, :revoke], with: -> {
@@ -30,10 +31,21 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"],
scopes_supported: ["openid", "profile", "email", "groups", "offline_access"],
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"],
claims_supported: ["sub", "email", "email_verified", "name", "preferred_username", "groups", "admin", "auth_time", "acr", "azp", "at_hash"],
claims_supported: [
"sub", # Always included
"email", # email scope
"email_verified", # email scope
"name", # profile scope
"preferred_username", # profile scope
"updated_at", # profile scope
"groups" # groups scope
# Note: Custom claims are also supported but not listed here
# ID-token-only claims (auth_time, acr, azp, at_hash, nonce) are not listed
],
code_challenge_methods_supported: ["plain", "S256"],
backchannel_logout_supported: true,
backchannel_logout_session_supported: true
backchannel_logout_session_supported: true,
request_parameter_supported: false
}
render json: config
@@ -56,32 +68,14 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
code_challenge = params[:code_challenge]
code_challenge_method = params[:code_challenge_method] || "plain"
# Validate required parameters
unless client_id.present? && redirect_uri.present? && response_type == "code"
error_details = []
error_details << "client_id is required" unless client_id.present?
error_details << "redirect_uri is required" unless redirect_uri.present?
error_details << "response_type must be 'code'" unless response_type == "code"
render plain: "Invalid request: #{error_details.join(", ")}", status: :bad_request
# Validate client_id first (required before we can look up the application)
# OAuth2 RFC 6749 Section 4.1.2.1: If client_id is missing/invalid, show error page (don't redirect)
unless client_id.present?
render plain: "Invalid request: client_id is required", status: :bad_request
return
end
# Validate PKCE parameters if present
if code_challenge.present?
unless %w[plain S256].include?(code_challenge_method)
render plain: "Invalid code_challenge_method: must be 'plain' or 'S256'", status: :bad_request
return
end
# Validate code challenge format (base64url-encoded, 43-128 characters)
unless code_challenge.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43,128}\z/)
render plain: "Invalid code_challenge format: must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding", status: :bad_request
return
end
end
# Find the application
# Find the application by client_id
@application = Application.find_by(client_id: client_id, app_type: "oidc")
unless @application
# Log all OIDC applications for debugging
@@ -99,7 +93,14 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
return
end
# Validate redirect URI first (required before we can safely redirect with errors)
# Validate redirect_uri presence and format
# OAuth2 RFC 6749 Section 4.1.2.1: If redirect_uri is missing/invalid, show error page (don't redirect)
unless redirect_uri.present?
render plain: "Invalid request: redirect_uri is required", status: :bad_request
return
end
# Validate redirect URI matches one of the registered URIs
unless @application.parsed_redirect_uris.include?(redirect_uri)
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Invalid request - redirect URI mismatch. Expected: #{@application.parsed_redirect_uris}, Got: #{redirect_uri}"
@@ -114,6 +115,56 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
return
end
# ============================================================================
# At this point we have a valid client_id and redirect_uri
# All subsequent errors should redirect back to the client with error parameters
# per OAuth2 RFC 6749 Section 4.1.2.1
# ============================================================================
# Reject request objects (JWT-encoded authorization parameters)
# Per OIDC Core §3.1.2.6: If request parameter is present and not supported,
# return request_not_supported error
if params[:request].present? || params[:request_uri].present?
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Request object not supported"
error_uri = "#{redirect_uri}?error=request_not_supported"
error_uri += "&error_description=#{CGI.escape("Request objects are not supported")}"
error_uri += "&state=#{CGI.escape(state)}" if state.present?
redirect_to error_uri, allow_other_host: true
return
end
# Validate response_type (now we can safely redirect with error)
unless response_type == "code"
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Invalid response_type: #{response_type}"
error_uri = "#{redirect_uri}?error=unsupported_response_type"
error_uri += "&error_description=#{CGI.escape("Only 'code' response_type is supported")}"
error_uri += "&state=#{CGI.escape(state)}" if state.present?
redirect_to error_uri, allow_other_host: true
return
end
# Validate PKCE parameters if present (now we can safely redirect with error)
if code_challenge.present?
unless %w[plain S256].include?(code_challenge_method)
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Invalid code_challenge_method: #{code_challenge_method}"
error_uri = "#{redirect_uri}?error=invalid_request"
error_uri += "&error_description=#{CGI.escape("Invalid code_challenge_method: must be 'plain' or 'S256'")}"
error_uri += "&state=#{CGI.escape(state)}" if state.present?
redirect_to error_uri, allow_other_host: true
return
end
# Validate code challenge format (base64url-encoded, 43-128 characters)
unless code_challenge.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43,128}\z/)
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Invalid code_challenge format"
error_uri = "#{redirect_uri}?error=invalid_request"
error_uri += "&error_description=#{CGI.escape("Invalid code_challenge format: must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding")}"
error_uri += "&state=#{CGI.escape(state)}" if state.present?
redirect_to error_uri, allow_other_host: true
return
end
end
# Check if application is active (now we can safely redirect with error)
unless @application.active?
Rails.logger.error "OAuth: Application is not active: #{@application.name}"
@@ -125,7 +176,17 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
# Check if user is authenticated
unless authenticated?
# Store OAuth parameters in session and redirect to sign in
# Handle prompt=none - no UI allowed, return error immediately
# Per OIDC Core spec §3.1.2.6: If prompt=none and user not authenticated,
# return login_required error without showing any UI
if params[:prompt] == "none"
error_uri = "#{redirect_uri}?error=login_required"
error_uri += "&state=#{CGI.escape(state)}" if state.present?
redirect_to error_uri, allow_other_host: true
return
end
# Normal flow: store OAuth parameters and redirect to sign in
session[:oauth_params] = {
client_id: client_id,
redirect_uri: redirect_uri,
@@ -135,10 +196,57 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
code_challenge: code_challenge,
code_challenge_method: code_challenge_method
}
# Store the current URL (with all OAuth params) for redirect after authentication
session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = request.url
redirect_to signin_path, alert: "Please sign in to continue"
return
end
# Handle prompt=login - force re-authentication
# Per OIDC Core spec §3.1.2.1: If prompt=login, the Authorization Server MUST prompt
# the End-User for reauthentication, even if the End-User is currently authenticated
if params[:prompt] == "login"
# Destroy current session to force re-authentication
# This creates a fresh authentication event with a new auth_time
Current.session&.destroy!
# Clear the session cookie so the user is truly logged out
cookies.delete(:session_id)
# Store the current URL (which contains all OAuth params) for redirect after login
# Remove prompt=login to prevent infinite re-auth loop
return_url = request.url.sub(/&prompt=login(?=&|$)|\?prompt=login&?/, '\1')
# Fix any resulting URL issues (like ?& or & at end)
return_url = return_url.gsub("?&", "?").gsub(/[?&]$/, "")
session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = return_url
redirect_to signin_path, alert: "Please sign in to continue"
return
end
# Handle max_age - require re-authentication if session is too old
# Per OIDC Core spec §3.1.2.1: If max_age is provided and the auth time is older,
# the Authorization Server MUST prompt for reauthentication
if params[:max_age].present?
max_age_seconds = params[:max_age].to_i
# Calculate session age
session_age_seconds = Time.current.to_i - Current.session.created_at.to_i
if session_age_seconds > max_age_seconds
# Session is too old - require re-authentication
# Store return URL in session (creates new session cookie)
# Destroy session and clear cookie to force fresh login
Current.session&.destroy!
cookies.delete(:session_id)
session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = request.url
redirect_to signin_path, alert: "Please sign in to continue"
return
end
end
# Get the authenticated user
user = Current.session.user
@@ -431,6 +539,10 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
scopes: auth_code.scope
)
# RFC6749-5.1: Token endpoint MUST return Cache-Control: no-store
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
# Return tokens
render json: {
access_token: access_token_record.plaintext_token, # Opaque token
@@ -560,6 +672,10 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
scopes: refresh_token_record.scope
)
# RFC6749-5.1: Token endpoint MUST return Cache-Control: no-store
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
# Return new tokens
render json: {
access_token: new_access_token.plaintext_token, # Opaque token
@@ -573,17 +689,22 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
render json: {error: "invalid_grant"}, status: :bad_request
end
# GET /oauth/userinfo
# GET/POST /oauth/userinfo
# OIDC Core spec: UserInfo endpoint MUST support GET, SHOULD support POST
def userinfo
# Extract access token from Authorization header
auth_header = request.headers["Authorization"]
unless auth_header&.start_with?("Bearer ")
# Extract access token from Authorization header or POST body
# RFC 6750: Bearer token can be in Authorization header, request body, or query string
token = if request.headers["Authorization"]&.start_with?("Bearer ")
request.headers["Authorization"].sub("Bearer ", "")
elsif request.params["access_token"].present?
request.params["access_token"]
end
unless token
head :unauthorized
return
end
token = auth_header.sub("Bearer ", "")
# Find and validate access token (opaque token with BCrypt hashing)
access_token = OidcAccessToken.find_by_token(token)
unless access_token&.active?
@@ -609,17 +730,35 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
consent = OidcUserConsent.find_by(user: user, application: access_token.application)
subject = consent&.sid || user.id.to_s
# Return user claims
# Parse scopes from access token (space-separated string)
requested_scopes = access_token.scope.to_s.split
# Return user claims (filter by scope per OIDC Core spec)
# Required claims (always included)
claims = {
sub: subject,
email: user.email_address,
email_verified: true,
preferred_username: user.email_address,
name: user.name.presence || user.email_address
sub: subject
}
# Add groups if user has any
if user.groups.any?
# Email claims (only if 'email' scope requested)
if requested_scopes.include?("email")
claims[:email] = user.email_address
claims[:email_verified] = true
end
# Profile claims (only if 'profile' scope requested)
# Per OIDC Core spec section 5.4, include available profile claims
# Only include claims we have data for - omit unknown claims rather than returning null
if requested_scopes.include?("profile")
# Use username if available, otherwise email as preferred_username
claims[:preferred_username] = user.username.presence || user.email_address
# Name: use stored name or fall back to email
claims[:name] = user.name.presence || user.email_address
# Time the user's information was last updated
claims[:updated_at] = user.updated_at.to_i
end
# Groups claim (only if 'groups' scope requested)
if requested_scopes.include?("groups") && user.groups.any?
claims[:groups] = user.groups.pluck(:name)
end
@@ -635,6 +774,10 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
application = access_token.application
claims.merge!(application.custom_claims_for_user(user))
# Security: Don't cache user data responses
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
render json: claims
end
@@ -779,12 +922,12 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController
}
end
# Validate code verifier format (base64url-encoded, 43-128 characters)
unless code_verifier.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43,128}\z/)
# Validate code verifier format (per RFC 7636: [A-Za-z0-9\-._~], 43-128 characters)
unless code_verifier.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_~]{43,128}\z/)
return {
valid: false,
error: "invalid_request",
error_description: "Invalid code_verifier format. Must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding",
error_description: "Invalid code_verifier format. Must be 43-128 characters [A-Z/a-z/0-9/-/./_/~]",
status: :bad_request
}
end

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ class SessionsController < ApplicationController
return
end
# Extract login_hint from the return URL for pre-filling the email field (OIDC spec)
@login_hint = nil
if session[:return_to_after_authenticating].present?
begin
uri = URI.parse(session[:return_to_after_authenticating])
if uri.query.present?
query_params = CGI.parse(uri.query)
@login_hint = query_params["login_hint"]&.first
end
rescue URI::InvalidURIError
# Ignore parsing errors
end
end
respond_to do |format|
format.html # render HTML login page
format.json { render json: {error: "Authentication required"}, status: :unauthorized }
@@ -73,7 +87,10 @@ class SessionsController < ApplicationController
# Sign in successful (password only)
start_new_session_for user, acr: "1"
redirect_to after_authentication_url, notice: "Signed in successfully.", allow_other_host: true
# Use status: :see_other to ensure browser makes a GET request
# This prevents Turbo from converting it to a TURBO_STREAM request
redirect_to after_authentication_url, notice: "Signed in successfully.", allow_other_host: true, status: :see_other
end
def verify_totp

View File

@@ -23,17 +23,10 @@ class OidcJwtService
iat: now
}
# Email claims (only if 'email' scope requested)
if requested_scopes.include?("email")
payload[:email] = user.email_address
payload[:email_verified] = true
end
# Profile claims (only if 'profile' scope requested)
if requested_scopes.include?("profile")
payload[:preferred_username] = user.username.presence || user.email_address
payload[:name] = user.name.presence || user.email_address
end
# NOTE: Email and profile claims are NOT included in the ID token for authorization code flow
# Per OIDC Core spec §5.4, these claims should only be returned via the UserInfo endpoint
# For implicit flow (response_type=id_token), claims would be included here, but we only
# support authorization code flow, so these claims are omitted from the ID token.
# Add nonce if provided (OIDC requires this for implicit flow)
payload[:nonce] = nonce if nonce.present?

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
autofocus: true,
autocomplete: "username",
placeholder: "your@email.com",
value: params[:email_address],
value: @login_hint || params[:email_address],
data: { action: "blur->webauthn#checkWebAuthnSupport change->webauthn#checkWebAuthnSupport" },
class: "block shadow-sm rounded-md border border-gray-400 focus:outline-blue-600 px-3 py-2 mt-2 w-full" %>
</div>

View File

@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ Rails.application.routes.draw do
# OIDC (OpenID Connect) routes
get "/.well-known/openid-configuration", to: "oidc#discovery"
get "/.well-known/jwks.json", to: "oidc#jwks"
get "/oauth/authorize", to: "oidc#authorize"
match "/oauth/authorize", to: "oidc#authorize", via: [:get, :post]
post "/oauth/authorize/consent", to: "oidc#consent", as: :oauth_consent
post "/oauth/token", to: "oidc#token"
post "/oauth/revoke", to: "oidc#revoke"
get "/oauth/userinfo", to: "oidc#userinfo"
match "/oauth/userinfo", to: "oidc#userinfo", via: [:get, :post]
get "/logout", to: "oidc#logout"
# ForwardAuth / Trusted Header SSO

View File

@@ -213,12 +213,23 @@ This checklist ensures Clinch meets security, quality, and documentation standar
- [ ] Suspicious login detection (geolocation, device fingerprinting)
- [ ] IP allowlist/blocklist
## External Security Review
## Protocol Conformance & Security Review
- [ ] Consider bug bounty or security audit
- [ ] Penetration testing for OIDC flows
- [ ] WebAuthn implementation review
- [ ] Token security review
**Protocol Conformance (Completed):**
- [x] **OpenID Connect Conformance Testing** - [48/48 tests passed](https://www.certification.openid.net/log-detail.html?log=TZ8vOG0kf35lUiD)
- OIDC authorization code flow ✅
- PKCE flow ✅
- Token security (ID tokens, access tokens, refresh tokens) ✅
- Scope-based claim filtering ✅
- Standard OIDC claims and metadata ✅
- Proper OAuth2 error handling (redirect vs. error page) ✅
**External Security Review (Optional for Post-Beta):**
- [ ] Traditional security audit or penetration test
- Note: OIDC conformance tests protocol compliance, not security vulnerabilities
- A dedicated security audit would test for injection, XSS, auth bypasses, etc.
- [ ] Bug bounty program
- [ ] WebAuthn implementation security review
## Documentation for Users
@@ -239,7 +250,8 @@ To move from "experimental" to "Beta", the following must be completed:
- [x] Basic documentation complete
- [x] Backup/restore documentation
- [x] Production deployment guide
- [ ] At least one external security review or penetration test
- [x] Protocol conformance validation
- [OpenID Connect Conformance Testing](https://www.certification.openid.net/log-detail.html?log=TZ8vOG0kf35lUiD) - **48 tests PASSED**, 0 failures, 0 warnings
**Important (Should have for Beta):**
- [x] Rate limiting on auth endpoints
@@ -258,22 +270,34 @@ To move from "experimental" to "Beta", the following must be completed:
## Status Summary
**Current Status:** Pre-Beta / Experimental
**Current Status:** Ready for Beta Release 🎉
**Strengths:**
- ✅ Comprehensive security tooling in place
- ✅ Strong test coverage (341 tests, 1349 assertions)
- ✅ Strong test coverage (374 tests, 1538 assertions)
- ✅ Modern security features (PKCE, token rotation, WebAuthn)
- ✅ Clean security scans (brakeman, bundler-audit)
- ✅ Clean security scans (brakeman, bundler-audit, Trivy)
- ✅ Well-documented codebase
-**OpenID Connect Conformance certified** - 48/48 tests passed
**Before Beta Release:**
- 🔶 External security review recommended
- 🔶 Admin audit logging (optional)
**All Critical Requirements Met:**
- All automated security scans passing ✅
- All tests passing (374 tests, 1542 assertions) ✅
- Core features implemented and tested ✅
- Documentation complete ✅
- Production deployment guide ✅
- Protocol conformance validation complete ✅
**Recommendation:** Consider Beta status after:
1. External security review or penetration testing
2. Real-world testing period
**Optional for Post-Beta:**
- Admin audit logging
- Traditional security audit/penetration test
- Bug bounty program
- Advanced monitoring/alerting
**Recommendation:**
Clinch meets all critical requirements for Beta release. The OIDC implementation is protocol-compliant (48/48 conformance tests passed), security scans are clean, and the codebase has strong test coverage.
For production use in security-sensitive environments, consider a traditional security audit or penetration test post-Beta to validate against common vulnerabilities (injection, XSS, auth bypasses, etc.) beyond protocol conformance.
---

View File

@@ -91,8 +91,10 @@ class OidcPkceControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
get "/oauth/authorize", params: auth_params
assert_response :bad_request
assert_match(/Invalid code_challenge_method/, @response.body)
# Should redirect back to client with error parameters (OAuth2 spec)
assert_response :redirect
assert_match(/error=invalid_request/, @response.location)
assert_match(/error_description=.*code_challenge_method/, @response.location)
end
test "authorization endpoint rejects invalid code_challenge format" do
@@ -108,8 +110,10 @@ class OidcPkceControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
get "/oauth/authorize", params: auth_params
assert_response :bad_request
assert_match(/Invalid code_challenge format/, @response.body)
# Should redirect back to client with error parameters (OAuth2 spec)
assert_response :redirect
assert_match(/error=invalid_request/, @response.location)
assert_match(/error_description=.*code_challenge.*format/, @response.location)
end
test "token endpoint requires code_verifier when PKCE was used (S256)" do

View File

@@ -228,7 +228,11 @@ class OidcRefreshTokenControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal @user.id.to_s, json["sub"]
# Should return pairwise SID from consent (alice has consent for kavita_app in fixtures)
consent = OidcUserConsent.find_by(user: @user, application: @application)
expected_sub = consent&.sid || @user.id.to_s
assert_equal expected_sub, json["sub"]
assert_equal @user.email_address, json["email"]
end
end

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
require "test_helper"
class OidcUserinfoControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
def setup
@user = users(:alice)
@application = applications(:kavita_app)
# Add user to a group for groups claim testing
@admin_group = groups(:admin_group)
@user.groups << @admin_group unless @user.groups.include?(@admin_group)
end
def teardown
# Clean up
OidcAccessToken.where(user: @user, application: @application).destroy_all
end
# ============================================================================
# HTTP Method Tests (GET and POST)
# ============================================================================
test "userinfo endpoint accepts GET requests" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert json["sub"].present?
end
test "userinfo endpoint accepts POST requests" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile")
post "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert json["sub"].present?
end
test "userinfo endpoint accepts POST with access_token in body" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile")
post "/oauth/userinfo", params: {
access_token: access_token.plaintext_token
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert json["sub"].present?
end
# ============================================================================
# Scope-Based Claim Filtering Tests
# ============================================================================
test "userinfo with openid scope only returns minimal claims" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# Required claims
assert json["sub"].present?, "Should include sub claim"
# Scope-dependent claims should NOT be present
assert_nil json["email"], "Should not include email without email scope"
assert_nil json["email_verified"], "Should not include email_verified without email scope"
assert_nil json["name"], "Should not include name without profile scope"
assert_nil json["preferred_username"], "Should not include preferred_username without profile scope"
assert_nil json["groups"], "Should not include groups without groups scope"
end
test "userinfo with email scope includes email claims" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# Required claims
assert json["sub"].present?
# Email claims should be present
assert_equal @user.email_address, json["email"], "Should include email with email scope"
assert_equal true, json["email_verified"], "Should include email_verified with email scope"
# Profile claims should NOT be present
assert_nil json["name"], "Should not include name without profile scope"
assert_nil json["preferred_username"], "Should not include preferred_username without profile scope"
end
test "userinfo with profile scope includes profile claims" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid profile")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# Required claims
assert json["sub"].present?
# Profile claims we support should be present
assert json["name"].present?, "Should include name with profile scope"
assert json["preferred_username"].present?, "Should include preferred_username with profile scope"
assert json["updated_at"].present?, "Should include updated_at with profile scope"
# Email claims should NOT be present
assert_nil json["email"], "Should not include email without email scope"
assert_nil json["email_verified"], "Should not include email_verified without email scope"
end
test "userinfo with groups scope includes groups claim" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid groups")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# Required claims
assert json["sub"].present?
# Groups claim should be present
assert json["groups"].present?, "Should include groups with groups scope"
assert_includes json["groups"], "Administrators", "Should include user's groups"
# Email and profile claims should NOT be present
assert_nil json["email"], "Should not include email without email scope"
assert_nil json["name"], "Should not include name without profile scope"
end
test "userinfo with multiple scopes includes all requested claims" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile groups")
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# All scope-based claims should be present
assert json["sub"].present?
assert json["email"].present?, "Should include email"
assert json["email_verified"].present?, "Should include email_verified"
assert json["name"].present?, "Should include name"
assert json["preferred_username"].present?, "Should include preferred_username"
assert json["groups"].present?, "Should include groups"
end
test "userinfo returns same filtered claims for GET and POST" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email")
# GET request
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
get_json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# POST request
post "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
post_json = JSON.parse(response.body)
# Both should return the same claims
assert_equal get_json, post_json, "GET and POST should return identical claims"
end
# ============================================================================
# Authentication Tests
# ============================================================================
test "userinfo endpoint requires Bearer token" do
get "/oauth/userinfo"
assert_response :unauthorized
end
test "userinfo endpoint rejects invalid token" do
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer invalid_token_12345"
}
assert_response :unauthorized
end
test "userinfo endpoint rejects expired token" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile")
# Expire the token
access_token.update!(expires_at: 1.hour.ago)
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :unauthorized
end
test "userinfo endpoint rejects revoked token" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid email profile")
# Revoke the token
access_token.revoke!
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :unauthorized
end
# ============================================================================
# Pairwise Subject Identifier Test
# ============================================================================
test "userinfo returns pairwise SID when consent exists" do
access_token = create_access_token("openid")
# Find existing consent or create new one (ensure it has a SID)
consent = OidcUserConsent.find_or_initialize_by(
user: @user,
application: @application
)
consent.scopes_granted ||= "openid"
consent.save!
# Reload to get the auto-generated SID
consent.reload
get "/oauth/userinfo", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer #{access_token.plaintext_token}"
}
assert_response :success
json = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal consent.sid, json["sub"], "Should use pairwise SID from consent"
assert consent.sid.present?, "Consent should have a SID"
end
private
def create_access_token(scope)
OidcAccessToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
scope: scope
)
end
end

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ alice_consent:
application: kavita_app
scopes_granted: openid profile email
granted_at: 2025-10-24 16:57:39
sid: alice-kavita-sid-12345
bob_consent:
user: bob
application: another_app
scopes_granted: openid email groups
granted_at: 2025-10-24 16:57:39
sid: bob-another-sid-67890