Minor release for the OAuth device flow (RFC 8628), token introspection
(RFC 7662), dynamic client registration (RFC 7591), and resource indicators
(RFC 8707), plus the security hardening from the branch review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DUaWqESTbUEdSi9erQ3jgt
Ships the access-check GET-form fix (782e197) as a published image.
v0.16.2 was bumped before the version-bump build workflow existed, so it
never built; this bump triggers the build via the registered push trigger.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The access check form POSTed and re-rendered :new with a 200 HTML
response, which Turbo rejects ("Form responses must redirect to
another location"), so the result panel never appeared. Since the
check is a read-only query, switch to a GET form and fold the lookup
into the new action. Results are now bookmarkable via the URL.
Bump version to 0.16.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
require-trusted-types-for only accepts 'script'; emitting 'none'
produced an invalid directive that browsers rejected. Omit the
directive entirely to leave Trusted Types unenforced (needed for
WebAuthn). Bump version to 0.16.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Sentry setup used a config.sentry.* accessor that sentry-rails has
never provided, so booting with SENTRY_DSN set raised NoMethodError
during environment load (e.g. db:prepare). The code only ran once a DSN
was configured, which is why it surfaced in production now.
Rewrites config/initializers/sentry.rb to call Sentry.init, the actual
sentry-ruby API, and removes the duplicate broken block from
production.rb. Verified production boots with SENTRY_DSN set
(Sentry.initialized? == true) and that the no-DSN path still early-returns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The CLINCH_HOST initializer raised during `assets:precompile` in the
Docker build, where no real host is set. Skip the check when
SECRET_KEY_BASE_DUMMY is present (the build-time precompile step);
deployed boots still require CLINCH_HOST.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
unsafe-inline on script-src neutered CSP as an XSS defense on the login and OAuth
consent pages (the highest-value targets in an IdP). Switch to a per-response
nonce for both script-src and style-src and drop unsafe-inline entirely.
- Add a random per-response nonce generator and apply it to script-src/style-src.
- Remove :unsafe_inline from both directives.
- Nonce the one hand-written inline script (dark-mode detection in the layout).
- Convert the 2 static style="display:none" attributes to class="hidden" (their
runtime toggle is done via element.style in JS, which CSP does not govern).
importmap-rails (2.2.3) already stamps the nonce onto its generated inline
importmap/module/preload tags, and Turbo (2.0.23) reads csp_meta_tag for its
injected <style>, so no other view changes were needed. Adds an integration test
asserting the enforcing header carries nonces, omits unsafe-inline, and that the
inline script's nonce matches the header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The TOTP and backup-code form field is named `code`, which was not covered by
the filter list, so live one-time codes landed in production logs. Adding :code
(partial match) also redacts the OAuth authorization `code` and PKCE
`code_verifier`/`code_challenge`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
determine_base_url fell back to request.host when CLINCH_HOST was unset. Rails
resolves request.host from X-Forwarded-Host behind a trusted proxy, so a spoofed
header could make the forward-auth login redirect point at an attacker origin
(host-header phishing).
- Add config/initializers/clinch_host.rb: fail fast at boot in any non-local
environment when CLINCH_HOST is blank. It anchors the OIDC issuer, WebAuthn
RP ID, and login redirect, so it must be explicit, never inferred.
- determine_base_url now uses CLINCH_HOST (guaranteed in production) with a safe
localhost default for dev/test, and never reads the request host.
- Simplify the spoofed-host regression test now that the fallback is safe.
Verified: production boot aborts with a clear message when CLINCH_HOST is blank,
and boots normally when set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Applications index used to render "All users" whenever an app had
no allowed_groups; under default-deny that's the opposite of the truth.
Replaced with a "No one" badge and, when groups are present, a
"N users · M groups" cell so the access reality is visible at a glance.
Added a small stats strip above the apps table: applications, users
with access, and groups granting access. Backed by preloaded counts in
the controller to avoid N+1.
Added /admin/access — a small "Access check" tool that takes a user
and an application and reports whether the user can reach it, with the
granting group(s) when allowed, and the specific reason when not
(inactive app/user, no allowed groups, or no shared group). Wired into
the admin sidebar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin users index only exposed Edit / Delete actions per row, so
the Accessible-applications panel on the user show page was unreachable
without typing the URL by hand. Adds a View action and turns the email
into a link to the show page — mirroring how the applications and
groups indexes already work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous <picture media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)"> only fires
when the OS is in dark mode. Clinch toggles dark mode with a class on
<html> via dark_mode_controller and Tailwind's @custom-variant dark
(&:where(.dark, .dark *)), so the picture source never swapped when
users clicked the in-app theme toggle. Render both <img> tags and
use Tailwind's dark:hidden / hidden dark:block so the swap follows
whatever strategy Tailwind is configured for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extracts the icon dropzone into a reusable partial so the dark mode
icon gets the same upload / drag-and-drop / paste affordances as the
light icon. Slims the dropzone to a single-row layout (small cloud
icon plus Upload / drag-and-drop / paste hint) and a tiny format hint
below, instead of the previous tall vertically-centred block.
When an application has no icon attached, render a deterministic
monogram SVG instead of the generic picture-frame placeholder. Initials
are picked from capital letters in the name (ShelfLife -> SL); fall
back to the first two letters when fewer than two capitals exist
(Audiobookshelf -> AU). Background colour is hashed from the name for
stable per-app identity across visits.
Adds an optional second icon attachment, icon_dark, alongside the main
icon. When present, render a <picture> with a prefers-color-scheme:
dark source so the browser swaps automatically; when absent, the main
icon is used in both modes. The SVG sanitization, content-type fix,
and size/format validation now run over both attachments uniformly.
Bumps to 0.14.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sanitize_svg_icon before_validation callback called icon.download,
but Active Storage uploads pending blobs in before_save — so at
before_validation time the file only existed in the request tempfile,
not at the configured storage path. Read from the pending attachable
(UploadedFile / IO hash) instead. Guards against the recursive callback
that icon.attach would otherwise trigger by tracking the cleaned
attachable by object identity. Bumps to 0.13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the implicit "empty allowed_groups means public" rule with
explicit default-deny across both OIDC and ForwardAuth. Adds two boolean
flags on Group — auto_assign (Keycloak-style auto-join on user create)
and admin (members can reach the admin panel) — and drops the
users.admin column entirely. Adds "Users with access" and "Accessible
applications" panels with via-group badges on the application/user show
pages.
BEHAVIOR CHANGE: a ForwardAuth app with no allowed_groups previously
bypassed authentication entirely; it now returns 403 like any other
unauthorized request. The data migration seeds an "everyone" group and
attaches it to all previously group-less apps to preserve behavior on
existing installs. An "admins" group is seeded and backfilled from any
user with the old admin column.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Patch release covering the Ruby 4.0.3, Rails 8.1.3, and transitive
gem updates landed since 0.10.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Substantial scope since 0.9.0: API keys for forward auth, SecurityMailer
alerts on 8 account-security events, dark mode, Remember-me with proper
browser-session cookie semantics, SvgScrubber for icon XSS, OIDC
auth-code replay revocation, forward-auth caching + rate limiting, and
fixes for broken invitation / password-reset emails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove PKCE plain method support (S256 only), enforce openid scope requirement,
filter to supported scopes, strip reserved claims from custom claims as
defense-in-depth, sanitize SVG icons with Loofah, add global input padding,
switch session cookies to SameSite=Lax, use Session.active scope, and remove
unsafe-eval from CSP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rate limit failed attempts (50/min per IP) with 429 + Retry-After.
Cache forward auth applications in a dedicated MemoryStore (8MB LRU)
to avoid loading all apps from SQLite on every request. Debounce
last_activity_at writes to at most once per minute per session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace CGI.parse (removed in Ruby 4.0) with Rack::Utils.parse_query
in application controller, sessions controller, and OIDC tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enables server-to-server authentication for forward auth applications
(e.g., video players accessing WebDAV) where browser cookies aren't
available. API keys use clk_ prefixed tokens stored as HMAC hashes.
Bearer token auth is checked before cookie auth in /api/verify.
Invalid tokens return 401 JSON (no redirect). Requests without
bearer tokens fall through to existing cookie flow unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
