Require CLINCH_HOST in deployed environments; drop request-host fallback

determine_base_url fell back to request.host when CLINCH_HOST was unset. Rails
resolves request.host from X-Forwarded-Host behind a trusted proxy, so a spoofed
header could make the forward-auth login redirect point at an attacker origin
(host-header phishing).

- Add config/initializers/clinch_host.rb: fail fast at boot in any non-local
  environment when CLINCH_HOST is blank. It anchors the OIDC issuer, WebAuthn
  RP ID, and login redirect, so it must be explicit, never inferred.
- determine_base_url now uses CLINCH_HOST (guaranteed in production) with a safe
  localhost default for dev/test, and never reads the request host.
- Simplify the spoofed-host regression test now that the fallback is safe.

Verified: production boot aborts with a clear message when CLINCH_HOST is blank,
and boots normally when set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

app/controllers/api/forward_auth_controller.rb

@@ -243,18 +243,13 @@ module Api
     def determine_base_url(redirect_url)
       return redirect_url if redirect_url.present?
 
-      if ENV["CLINCH_HOST"].present?
-        host = ENV["CLINCH_HOST"]
-        host.match?(/^https?:\/\//) ? host : "https://#{host}"
-      else
-        request_host = request.host || request.headers["X-Forwarded-Host"]
-        if request_host.present?
-          Rails.logger.warn "ForwardAuth: CLINCH_HOST not set, using request host: #{request_host}"
-          "https://#{request_host}"
-        else
-          raise StandardError, "ForwardAuth: CLINCH_HOST environment variable not set and no request host available."
-        end
-      end
+      # CLINCH_HOST is the IdP's canonical origin and is mandatory in deployed
+      # environments (enforced at boot in config/initializers/clinch_host.rb).
+      # We never fall back to the request host: a spoofed X-Forwarded-Host would
+      # otherwise redirect the login flow to an attacker-controlled origin. The
+      # localhost default only applies to local dev/test.
+      host = ENV["CLINCH_HOST"].presence || "http://localhost:3000"
+      host.match?(%r{\Ahttps?://}) ? host : "https://#{host}"
     end
   end
 end

config/initializers/clinch_host.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# CLINCH_HOST is this IdP's canonical external origin, e.g. https://auth.example.com.
+# It anchors the OIDC issuer, the WebAuthn RP ID, and the forward-auth login
+# redirect. In deployed (non-local) environments it MUST be set explicitly and
+# never inferred from request headers — X-Forwarded-Host is attacker-influenceable,
+# so inferring the origin from it would allow host-header phishing and open
+# redirects. Fail fast at boot rather than start in an unsafe configuration.
+unless Rails.env.local?
+  if ENV["CLINCH_HOST"].blank?
+    raise "CLINCH_HOST must be set (e.g. https://auth.example.com). It is the " \
+          "canonical origin of this Clinch instance and must not be inferred " \
+          "from request headers."
+  end
+end

test/integration/forward_auth_integration_test.rb

@@ -177,13 +177,10 @@ class ForwardAuthIntegrationTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
   end
 
   test "spoofed X-Forwarded-Host is not reflected as a redirect target" do
-    # CLINCH_HOST pins the IdP origin (as in production) so base_url cannot be
-    # influenced by the request; this isolates the return_to/redirect behaviour.
-    original_clinch_host = ENV["CLINCH_HOST"]
-    ENV["CLINCH_HOST"] = "https://auth.example.com"
-
     # No forward-auth app exists for evil.com, and no valid rd is supplied. The
-    # attacker-controlled host must NOT be stored or reflected into the signin URL.
+    # attacker-controlled host must NOT be stored or reflected into the signin URL,
+    # and base_url must come from CLINCH_HOST (or the safe localhost default in
+    # test) rather than the request host.
     get "/api/verify", headers: {
       "X-Forwarded-Host" => "evil.com",
       "X-Forwarded-Uri" => "/steal"
@@ -193,8 +190,6 @@ class ForwardAuthIntegrationTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
     assert_match %r{/signin}, response.location
     refute_includes response.location, "evil.com"
     refute_match(/evil\.com/, session[:return_to_after_authenticating].to_s)
-  ensure
-    ENV["CLINCH_HOST"] = original_clinch_host
   end
 
   test "return URL functionality after authentication" do