Require CLINCH_HOST in deployed environments; drop request-host fallback
determine_base_url fell back to request.host when CLINCH_HOST was unset. Rails resolves request.host from X-Forwarded-Host behind a trusted proxy, so a spoofed header could make the forward-auth login redirect point at an attacker origin (host-header phishing). - Add config/initializers/clinch_host.rb: fail fast at boot in any non-local environment when CLINCH_HOST is blank. It anchors the OIDC issuer, WebAuthn RP ID, and login redirect, so it must be explicit, never inferred. - determine_base_url now uses CLINCH_HOST (guaranteed in production) with a safe localhost default for dev/test, and never reads the request host. - Simplify the spoofed-host regression test now that the fallback is safe. Verified: production boot aborts with a clear message when CLINCH_HOST is blank, and boots normally when set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -177,13 +177,10 @@ class ForwardAuthIntegrationTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
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end
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test "spoofed X-Forwarded-Host is not reflected as a redirect target" do
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# CLINCH_HOST pins the IdP origin (as in production) so base_url cannot be
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# influenced by the request; this isolates the return_to/redirect behaviour.
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original_clinch_host = ENV["CLINCH_HOST"]
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ENV["CLINCH_HOST"] = "https://auth.example.com"
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# No forward-auth app exists for evil.com, and no valid rd is supplied. The
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# attacker-controlled host must NOT be stored or reflected into the signin URL.
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# attacker-controlled host must NOT be stored or reflected into the signin URL,
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# and base_url must come from CLINCH_HOST (or the safe localhost default in
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# test) rather than the request host.
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get "/api/verify", headers: {
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"X-Forwarded-Host" => "evil.com",
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"X-Forwarded-Uri" => "/steal"
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@@ -193,8 +190,6 @@ class ForwardAuthIntegrationTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
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assert_match %r{/signin}, response.location
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refute_includes response.location, "evil.com"
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refute_match(/evil\.com/, session[:return_to_after_authenticating].to_s)
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ensure
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ENV["CLINCH_HOST"] = original_clinch_host
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end
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test "return URL functionality after authentication" do
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