Files
clinch/test/controllers/oidc_claims_security_test.rb
T
Dan MilneandClaude Opus 4.8 017dfdff0e Harden OIDC token endpoints from security review
Fixes from review of the device flow / introspection / DCR work:

Introspection over-disclosure (RFC 7662):
- Restrict introspection to authorized callers — the client a token was issued
  to, or a resource server registered (resource_identifiers) to serve the token's
  bound RFC 8707 audience. Unauthorized callers get {active:false}, disclosing
  nothing, instead of any confidential client reading any token.
- Scope-gate disclosed claims: username only with the email scope, groups only
  with the groups scope (mirrors userinfo). ADR 0005.

Tokens minted for revoked users:
- Re-check application.user_allowed?(user) at mint time in the device, refresh,
  and authorization-code grants (covers app-active, user-active, group
  membership). A user deactivated or removed from the allowed group between
  approval and the token request is refused with access_denied. The refresh
  check runs before rotation so a denied refresh has no side effects.

Device authorization hardening:
- Require confidential clients to authenticate, and require PKCE (code_challenge)
  up front for clients that require it, so an intercepted device_code plus a
  known public client_id cannot redeem tokens.
- Merge (not overwrite) the shared consent record on device approval.

Tests: new oidc_introspection_test and oidc_mint_authorization_test; existing
PKCE/claims tests updated to grant app access (they created ungrouped apps and
relied on the token endpoint not checking authorization). Full suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq
2026-07-19 13:19:41 +10:00

399 lines
14 KiB
Ruby

require "test_helper"
class OidcClaimsSecurityTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
setup do
@user = User.create!(email_address: "claims_security_test@example.com", password: "password123")
@application = Application.create!(
name: "Claims Security Test App",
slug: "claims-security-test-app",
app_type: "oidc",
redirect_uris: ["http://localhost:4000/callback"].to_json,
active: true,
require_pkce: false
)
# Store the plain text client secret for testing
@application.generate_new_client_secret!
@plain_client_secret = @application.client_secret
@application.save!
# The user must be allowed on the app for tokens to be minted (mint-time
# authorization re-check); these tests create codes/tokens directly.
grant_everyone_access(@application)
end
def teardown
# Delete in correct order to avoid foreign key constraints
OidcRefreshToken.where(application: @application).delete_all
OidcAccessToken.where(application: @application).delete_all
OidcAuthorizationCode.where(application: @application).delete_all
OidcUserConsent.where(application: @application).delete_all
@user.destroy
@application.destroy
end
# ====================
# CLAIMS PARAMETER ESCALATION ATTACKS
# ====================
test "rejects claims parameter during authorization code exchange" do
# Create consent with minimal scopes (no profile, email, or admin access)
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-123"
)
auth_code = OidcAuthorizationCode.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
scope: "openid",
expires_at: 10.minutes.from_now
)
# ATTEMPT: Inject claims parameter during token exchange (ATTACK!)
# The client is trying to request 'admin' claim that they never got consent for
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: auth_code.plaintext_code,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
claims: '{"id_token":{"admin":{"essential":true}}}' # ← ATTACK!
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
# SHOULD: Reject the claims parameter - it's only allowed in authorization requests
assert_response :bad_request
error = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal "invalid_request", error["error"], "Should reject claims parameter at token endpoint"
assert_match(/claims.*not allowed|unsupported parameter/i, error["error_description"], "Error should mention claims parameter not allowed")
end
test "rejects claims parameter during authorization code exchange with profile escalation" do
# Create consent with ONLY openid scope (no profile scope)
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-123"
)
auth_code = OidcAuthorizationCode.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
scope: "openid",
expires_at: 10.minutes.from_now
)
# ATTEMPT: Try to get profile claims via claims parameter without profile scope
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: auth_code.plaintext_code,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
claims: '{"id_token":{"name":null,"email":{"essential":true}}}'
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
# SHOULD: Reject the claims parameter
assert_response :bad_request
error = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal "invalid_request", error["error"]
end
test "rejects claims parameter during refresh token grant" do
access_token = OidcAccessToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
scope: "openid"
)
refresh_token = OidcRefreshToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
oidc_access_token: access_token,
scope: "openid"
)
plaintext_refresh_token = refresh_token.token
# ATTEMPT: Inject claims parameter during refresh (ATTACK!)
# Trying to escalate to admin claims during refresh
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "refresh_token",
refresh_token: plaintext_refresh_token,
claims: '{"id_token":{"admin":true,"role":{"essential":true}}}' # ← ATTACK!
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
# SHOULD: Reject the claims parameter
assert_response :bad_request
error = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal "invalid_request", error["error"], "Should reject claims parameter at refresh token endpoint"
assert_match(/claims.*not allowed|unsupported parameter/i, error["error_description"])
end
test "rejects claims parameter during refresh token grant with custom claims escalation" do
# Setup: User has a custom claim at user level
@user.update!(custom_claims: {"role" => "user"})
access_token = OidcAccessToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
scope: "openid"
)
refresh_token = OidcRefreshToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
oidc_access_token: access_token,
scope: "openid"
)
plaintext_refresh_token = refresh_token.token
# ATTEMPT: Try to escalate role to admin via claims parameter
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "refresh_token",
refresh_token: plaintext_refresh_token,
claims: '{"id_token":{"role":{"value":"admin"}}}' # ← ATTACK! Trying to override role value
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
# SHOULD: Reject the claims parameter
assert_response :bad_request
error = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal "invalid_request", error["error"]
end
test "allows token exchange without claims parameter" do
# Create consent
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid profile",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-123"
)
auth_code = OidcAuthorizationCode.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
scope: "openid profile",
expires_at: 10.minutes.from_now
)
# Normal token exchange WITHOUT claims parameter should work fine
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: auth_code.plaintext_code,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback"
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
assert_response :success
response_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert response_body.key?("access_token")
assert response_body.key?("id_token")
end
test "allows refresh without claims parameter" do
# Create consent for this application
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid profile",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-refresh-456"
)
access_token = OidcAccessToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
scope: "openid profile"
)
refresh_token = OidcRefreshToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
oidc_access_token: access_token,
scope: "openid profile"
)
plaintext_refresh_token = refresh_token.token
# Normal refresh WITHOUT claims parameter should work fine
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "refresh_token",
refresh_token: plaintext_refresh_token
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
assert_response :success
response_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert response_body.key?("access_token")
assert response_body.key?("id_token")
end
# ====================
# CLAIMS PARAMETER IS AUTHORIZATION-ONLY
# ====================
test "claims parameter is only valid in authorization request per OIDC spec" do
# Per OIDC Core spec section 18.2.1, claims parameter usage location is "Authorization Request"
# This test verifies that claims parameter cannot be used at token endpoint
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-123"
)
auth_code = OidcAuthorizationCode.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
scope: "openid",
expires_at: 10.minutes.from_now
)
# Test various attempts to inject claims parameter
malicious_claims = [
'{"id_token":{"admin":true}}',
'{"id_token":{"email":{"essential":true}}}',
'{"userinfo":{"groups":{"values":["admin"]}}}',
'{"id_token":{"custom_claim":"custom_value"}}',
"invalid-json"
]
malicious_claims.each do |claims_value|
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: auth_code.plaintext_code,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
claims: claims_value
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
# All should be rejected
assert_response :bad_request, "Claims parameter '#{claims_value}' should be rejected"
error = JSON.parse(response.body)
assert_equal "invalid_request", error["error"]
end
end
# ====================
# VERIFY CONSENT-BASED ACCESS IS ENFORCED
# ====================
test "token endpoint respects scopes granted during authorization" do
# Create consent with ONLY openid scope (no email, profile, etc.)
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-123"
)
auth_code = OidcAuthorizationCode.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback",
scope: "openid",
expires_at: 10.minutes.from_now
)
# Exchange code for tokens
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: auth_code.plaintext_code,
redirect_uri: "http://localhost:4000/callback"
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
assert_response :success
response_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
id_token = response_body["id_token"]
# Decode ID token to check claims
decoded = JWT.decode(id_token, nil, false).first
# Should only have required claims, not email/profile
assert_includes decoded.keys, "iss"
assert_includes decoded.keys, "sub"
assert_includes decoded.keys, "aud"
assert_includes decoded.keys, "exp"
assert_includes decoded.keys, "iat"
# Should NOT have claims that weren't consented to
refute_includes decoded.keys, "email", "Should not include email without email scope"
refute_includes decoded.keys, "email_verified", "Should not include email_verified without email scope"
refute_includes decoded.keys, "name", "Should not include name without profile scope"
refute_includes decoded.keys, "preferred_username", "Should not include preferred_username without profile scope"
end
test "refresh token preserves original scopes granted during authorization" do
# Create consent with specific scopes
OidcUserConsent.create!(
user: @user,
application: @application,
scopes_granted: "openid email",
granted_at: Time.current,
sid: "test-sid-refresh-123"
)
access_token = OidcAccessToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
scope: "openid email"
)
refresh_token = OidcRefreshToken.create!(
application: @application,
user: @user,
oidc_access_token: access_token,
scope: "openid email"
)
plaintext_refresh_token = refresh_token.token
# Refresh the token
post "/oauth/token", params: {
grant_type: "refresh_token",
refresh_token: plaintext_refresh_token
}, headers: {
"Authorization" => "Basic " + Base64.strict_encode64("#{@application.client_id}:#{@plain_client_secret}")
}
assert_response :success
response_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
id_token = response_body["id_token"]
# Decode ID token to verify scopes are preserved
decoded = JWT.decode(id_token, nil, false).first
# Should have email claims (from original consent)
assert_includes decoded.keys, "email", "Should preserve email scope from original consent"
assert_includes decoded.keys, "email_verified", "Should preserve email_verified scope from original consent"
# Should NOT have profile claims (not in original consent)
refute_includes decoded.keys, "name", "Should not add profile claims that weren't consented to"
refute_includes decoded.keys, "preferred_username", "Should not add preferred_username that wasn't consented to"
end
end