Two more fixes from the device-flow security review: slow_down interval grew without bound (OidcController): - Each too-fast poll bumped the persisted interval by 5s with no ceiling, so a client polling slightly fast — or an attacker spamming a known device_code — could balloon it (5→10→15→…) past the 10-minute expiry and starve a legitimate client of its token. Clamp the bump to OidcDeviceCode::MAX_INTERVAL (30s); a client polling at the advertised interval is never throttled. Expired device codes accumulated forever (OidcTokenCleanupJob): - Anonymous callers can create device codes via /oauth/device_authorization, and expired/denied/abandoned rows were never reaped. Sweep rows past expiry (with a 1-hour grace to stay clear of in-flight redemption); redeemed codes are already destroyed at token issuance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Q4ATZHoMCWqvSpE2yYoie
119 lines
3.9 KiB
Ruby
119 lines
3.9 KiB
Ruby
# OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant code (RFC 8628).
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#
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# Mirrors OidcAuthorizationCode: the long device_code is opaque and stored as an
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# HMAC, while the short user_code is stored in plaintext because the user types it
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# back on the verification page. A record is created "pending" by the device
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# authorization endpoint, moved to "approved" (with a user) or "denied" on the
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# verification page, and consumed by the token endpoint once approved.
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class OidcDeviceCode < ApplicationRecord
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belongs_to :application
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belongs_to :user, optional: true # nil until the request is approved
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# Alphabet for the user_code: uppercase letters + digits, minus visually
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# ambiguous characters (0/O, 1/I, etc.) so it is easy to read and type.
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USER_CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789".chars.freeze
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USER_CODE_GROUP_SIZE = 4
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USER_CODE_GROUPS = 2 # e.g. "WDJB-MJHT"
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STATUSES = %w[pending approved denied].freeze
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# Polling interval, in seconds. The token endpoint bumps the persisted interval
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# by INTERVAL_INCREMENT on each too-fast poll (RFC 8628 §3.5 slow_down), but
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# clamps it to MAX_INTERVAL so a client polling slightly fast — or an attacker
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# spamming a known device_code — can't balloon it past the expiry window and
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# starve a well-behaved client of its token.
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INTERVAL_INCREMENT = 5
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MAX_INTERVAL = 30
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attr_accessor :plaintext_device_code
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before_validation :generate_device_code, on: :create
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before_validation :generate_user_code, on: :create
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before_validation :set_expiry, on: :create
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validates :device_code_hmac, presence: true, uniqueness: true
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validates :user_code, presence: true, uniqueness: true
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validates :status, inclusion: {in: STATUSES}
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validates :code_challenge_method, inclusion: {in: %w[S256], allow_nil: true}
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validate :validate_code_challenge_format, if: -> { code_challenge.present? }
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scope :valid, -> { where(status: "pending").where("expires_at > ?", Time.current) }
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scope :expired, -> { where("expires_at <= ?", Time.current) }
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# Find a device code by its plaintext device_code using HMAC verification.
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def self.find_by_plaintext_device_code(plaintext_device_code)
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return nil if plaintext_device_code.blank?
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find_by(device_code_hmac: compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code))
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end
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# Look up a device code by the human-typed user_code. Normalizes case and
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# strips separators/whitespace so "wdjb-mjht" and "WDJB MJHT" both match.
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def self.find_by_user_code(user_code)
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return nil if user_code.blank?
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find_by(user_code: normalize_user_code(user_code))
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end
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def self.normalize_user_code(user_code)
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user_code.to_s.upcase.gsub(/[^A-Z0-9]/, "")
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end
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def self.compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code)
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OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest("SHA256", TokenHmac::KEY, plaintext_device_code)
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end
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def expired?
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expires_at <= Time.current
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end
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def pending?
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status == "pending"
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end
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def approved?
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status == "approved"
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end
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def denied?
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status == "denied"
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end
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def uses_pkce?
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code_challenge.present?
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end
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# Grant the request: attach the approving user and capture their auth context.
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def approve!(user:, acr:, auth_time:)
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update!(status: "approved", user: user, acr: acr, auth_time: auth_time)
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end
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def deny!
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update!(status: "denied")
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end
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private
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def generate_device_code
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self.plaintext_device_code ||= SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(48)
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self.device_code_hmac ||= self.class.compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code)
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end
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def generate_user_code
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self.user_code ||= USER_CODE_GROUPS.times.map do
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USER_CODE_GROUP_SIZE.times.map { USER_CODE_ALPHABET.sample }.join
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end.join
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end
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def set_expiry
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self.expires_at ||= 10.minutes.from_now
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end
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def validate_code_challenge_format
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# PKCE code challenge should be base64url-encoded, 43-128 characters.
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unless code_challenge.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43,128}\z/)
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errors.add(:code_challenge, "must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding")
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end
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end
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end
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