Clients can name a target resource server via the `resource` parameter at the authorization and device-authorization endpoints. Clinch binds it to the issued token as its audience and reports it at introspection as `aud`, so a token minted for one API cannot be replayed against another that also trusts clinch. - `resource` is validated syntax-only (absolute URI, no fragment) — pass-through, no resource registry; the resource server enforces the audience on introspection - threaded from authorize / device_authorization onto the auth/device code, then the access and refresh tokens, and carried across refresh rotation - invalid values are rejected with error=invalid_target - introspection `aud` is the bound resource, falling back to the client_id - ADR 0004 records the pass-through-vs-registry decision Completes the clinch-side OAuth surface for MCP connectors (with DCR + introspection); Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) lives on the resource server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq
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Architecture Decision Records
Short, dated records of non-obvious technical decisions in Clinch. They live in the repo (rather than a wiki) so they version with the code and travel with a checkout.
Each file is one decision. Newest decisions get the next number.
| # | Decision |
|---|---|
| 0001 | Access tokens are opaque (not JWT); resource servers use introspection |
| 0002 | CLI/agent auth uses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) |
| 0003 | Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), runtime-gated + default-deny |
| 0004 | Resource Indicators (RFC 8707) bind token audience; pass-through validation |