active? was only checked at the password step of sign-in. A user disabled
afterwards could (a) still complete the 2FA step and mint a valid session, and
(b) keep using any existing session until natural expiry, because per-request
auth only checked session expiry, not user status.
Three enforcement points:
- Mid-flow guard: verify_totp and webauthn_verify re-check active? before
start_new_session_for, clearing the pending session and rejecting if disabled.
- Request-time guard: find_session_by_cookie now uses Session.for_active_user,
so a session whose user is disabled no longer authenticates (authoritative,
catches any disable path including direct DB changes).
- Immediate cleanup: User#revoke_sessions_when_deactivated destroys a user's
sessions when status changes away from active, so access is revoked everywhere
at once rather than on the next request.
Tests cover the mid-flow TOTP rejection, request-time rejection of an existing
session after disable, session destruction on disable, and that unrelated
updates leave sessions intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
verify_totp called ROTP without `after:`, so a captured 6-digit code stayed
valid for the full ~90s drift window and could be replayed in a separate
sign-in. Add a last_otp_at column, pass it as ROTP's `after:`, and persist the
matched timestep on success so a code (or any earlier one) cannot be reused.
Also fixes a latent bug surfaced by the new replay path: enable_totp! did
`self.backup_codes = generate_backup_codes`, reassigning backup_codes to the
plaintext return value (generate_backup_codes already stores the BCrypt hashes
internally). That stored backup codes in plaintext and broke verification.
enable_totp! is test-only today, but it is public and backup_codes is not
encrypted, so this is a real footgun. Now it just calls generate_backup_codes.
Rewrites the mislabeled "TOTP code cannot be reused" test to actually assert
that replaying an accepted code is rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the implicit "empty allowed_groups means public" rule with
explicit default-deny across both OIDC and ForwardAuth. Adds two boolean
flags on Group — auto_assign (Keycloak-style auto-join on user create)
and admin (members can reach the admin panel) — and drops the
users.admin column entirely. Adds "Users with access" and "Accessible
applications" panels with via-group badges on the application/user show
pages.
BEHAVIOR CHANGE: a ForwardAuth app with no allowed_groups previously
bypassed authentication entirely; it now returns 403 like any other
unauthorized request. The data migration seeds an "everyone" group and
attaches it to all previously group-less apps to preserve behavior on
existing installs. An "admins" group is seeded and backfilled from any
user with the old admin column.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove PKCE plain method support (S256 only), enforce openid scope requirement,
filter to supported scopes, strip reserved claims from custom claims as
defense-in-depth, sanitize SVG icons with Loofah, add global input padding,
switch session cookies to SameSite=Lax, use Session.active scope, and remove
unsafe-eval from CSP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enables server-to-server authentication for forward auth applications
(e.g., video players accessing WebDAV) where browser cookies aren't
available. API keys use clk_ prefixed tokens stored as HMAC hashes.
Bearer token auth is checked before cookie auth in /api/verify.
Invalid tokens return 401 JSON (no redirect). Requests without
bearer tokens fall through to existing cookie flow unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
