Security-review follow-ups on the OIDC flows.
IPv6 loopback redirect_uri in dynamic client registration (RFC 8252):
- valid_redirect_uri? compared URI#host, which returns the bracketed "[::1]"
for IPv6 literals, so http://[::1]:PORT/... was always rejected. Compare
#hostname (unbracketed) instead, unblocking IPv6-only native clients.
Extract redirect_authorize_error (removes 12 copies of the boilerplate):
- The authorize/consent flows built the error redirect by hand ~a dozen times
(error_uri = "...?error=..."; += "&error_description=#{CGI.escape ...}"; +=
state; redirect_to). One helper now composes the query, and — unlike every
copy — appends "&error=..." when the redirect_uri already has a query string
instead of a malformed second "?".
Extract token-endpoint helpers (removes ~80 duplicated lines):
- authenticate_token_client: the identical client-auth preamble shared by the
authorization-code, refresh, and device-code grants.
- render_token_triple: the access + refresh + id_token mint and RFC 6749 §5.1
response shared by the authorization-code and device-code grants.
Single source of truth for scope descriptions:
- New OidcHelper#scope_description + shared shared/_scope_list partial, used by
both the browser consent screen and the device authorization screen; drops the
scope_labels hash and the hard-coded per-scope blocks that would have drifted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Q4ATZHoMCWqvSpE2yYoie
The terminal states (expired / already-used / not-found) were duplicated as
markup in show and result, and #verify re-implemented the nil→expired→!pending
cascade that #show already had — a copy edit meant four touch points.
- device_code_state(dc) resolves a code to :not_found / :expired /
:already_handled / :ok. Both #show and #verify branch on it, so the cascade
lives in one place.
- _terminal_state partial renders the terminal heading/message/link once;
result.html.erb now renders it instead of inlining the markup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq
Adds three OAuth surfaces to the OIDC provider so CLIs, terminal agents, and
MCP connectors can authenticate as real users instead of using static API keys.
Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628):
- OidcDeviceCode model (HMAC device_code, short plaintext user_code, nullable
user until approval, slow_down polling state), mirroring OidcAuthorizationCode
- POST /oauth/device_authorization issues the code pair + verification URIs
- device_code grant on /oauth/token returns authorization_pending / slow_down /
access_denied / expired_token, then the standard token triple; single-use
- Authenticated /device approval page, gated by Application#user_allowed?
Token Introspection (RFC 7662):
- POST /oauth/introspect: confidential-caller-authenticated; returns active,
scope, and the user's groups so resource servers can authorize on membership
Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591):
- POST /oauth/register creates public/confidential clients (PKCE required)
- Runtime toggle via a new Setting store + admin switch on the Applications page;
off by default, env var CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED as bootstrap fallback
- New clients are default-deny (no allowed_groups) until an admin grants access
- RFC 8414 metadata alias at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server;
registration_endpoint advertised only while the window is open
Discovery advertises all three grants/endpoints. Seeds add a clinch-cli public
client and a c2a2-introspection confidential client. ADRs in docs/decisions
record the opaque-vs-JWT, device-flow, and DCR-security decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq
The access check form POSTed and re-rendered :new with a 200 HTML
response, which Turbo rejects ("Form responses must redirect to
another location"), so the result panel never appeared. Since the
check is a read-only query, switch to a GET form and fold the lookup
into the new action. Results are now bookmarkable via the URL.
Bump version to 0.16.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
unsafe-inline on script-src neutered CSP as an XSS defense on the login and OAuth
consent pages (the highest-value targets in an IdP). Switch to a per-response
nonce for both script-src and style-src and drop unsafe-inline entirely.
- Add a random per-response nonce generator and apply it to script-src/style-src.
- Remove :unsafe_inline from both directives.
- Nonce the one hand-written inline script (dark-mode detection in the layout).
- Convert the 2 static style="display:none" attributes to class="hidden" (their
runtime toggle is done via element.style in JS, which CSP does not govern).
importmap-rails (2.2.3) already stamps the nonce onto its generated inline
importmap/module/preload tags, and Turbo (2.0.23) reads csp_meta_tag for its
injected <style>, so no other view changes were needed. Adds an integration test
asserting the enforcing header carries nonces, omits unsafe-inline, and that the
inline script's nonce matches the header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two problems with sign-count clone detection:
- suspicious_sign_count? flagged the case where both the stored and presented
counts are 0. Most synced passkeys (Apple/Google) report 0 every time, so every
legitimate sign-in was flagged — drowning real signals in noise. Per WebAuthn
§6.1.1 a 0 counter means "no counter"; only flag when BOTH counts are non-zero
and the new one does not advance.
- On a suspicious count the controller only logged a warning and then continued
to authenticate and overwrite the stored counter. A cloned credential therefore
worked indefinitely. webauthn_verify now rejects the sign-in (no session, no
counter update) and emails the user via a new SecurityMailer#suspicious_passkey_used.
Tests cover the corrected classification (synced/first-use/normal vs equal/
decreasing) and the new alert email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Applications index used to render "All users" whenever an app had
no allowed_groups; under default-deny that's the opposite of the truth.
Replaced with a "No one" badge and, when groups are present, a
"N users · M groups" cell so the access reality is visible at a glance.
Added a small stats strip above the apps table: applications, users
with access, and groups granting access. Backed by preloaded counts in
the controller to avoid N+1.
Added /admin/access — a small "Access check" tool that takes a user
and an application and reports whether the user can reach it, with the
granting group(s) when allowed, and the specific reason when not
(inactive app/user, no allowed groups, or no shared group). Wired into
the admin sidebar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin users index only exposed Edit / Delete actions per row, so
the Accessible-applications panel on the user show page was unreachable
without typing the URL by hand. Adds a View action and turns the email
into a link to the show page — mirroring how the applications and
groups indexes already work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extracts the icon dropzone into a reusable partial so the dark mode
icon gets the same upload / drag-and-drop / paste affordances as the
light icon. Slims the dropzone to a single-row layout (small cloud
icon plus Upload / drag-and-drop / paste hint) and a tiny format hint
below, instead of the previous tall vertically-centred block.
When an application has no icon attached, render a deterministic
monogram SVG instead of the generic picture-frame placeholder. Initials
are picked from capital letters in the name (ShelfLife -> SL); fall
back to the first two letters when fewer than two capitals exist
(Audiobookshelf -> AU). Background colour is hashed from the name for
stable per-app identity across visits.
Adds an optional second icon attachment, icon_dark, alongside the main
icon. When present, render a <picture> with a prefers-color-scheme:
dark source so the browser swaps automatically; when absent, the main
icon is used in both modes. The SVG sanitization, content-type fix,
and size/format validation now run over both attachments uniformly.
Bumps to 0.14.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the implicit "empty allowed_groups means public" rule with
explicit default-deny across both OIDC and ForwardAuth. Adds two boolean
flags on Group — auto_assign (Keycloak-style auto-join on user create)
and admin (members can reach the admin panel) — and drops the
users.admin column entirely. Adds "Users with access" and "Accessible
applications" panels with via-group badges on the application/user show
pages.
BEHAVIOR CHANGE: a ForwardAuth app with no allowed_groups previously
bypassed authentication entirely; it now returns 403 like any other
unauthorized request. The data migration seeds an "everyone" group and
attaches it to all previously group-less apps to preserve behavior on
existing installs. An "admins" group is seeded and backfilled from any
user with the old admin column.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an "Assigned Applications" checkbox list to the group new/edit
form so admins can grant a group access to multiple apps from one
screen, instead of editing each application individually.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously the copy-pasteable env-var block only appeared right after
creating an app or regenerating credentials. Operators had no easy way
back to it, so they had to reconstruct OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL etc. from
memory.
Adds a collapsed <details> disclosure inside the OIDC Configuration
card with the same env vars (placeholder for the secret, which can't
be re-shown). Extracts the env-line construction into an
oidc_env_lines helper so the flash panel and the persistent display
share one source of truth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Surfaces OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET, discovery URL, provider name, and PKCE
flag in a single textarea on the credentials flash so the client config
can be dropped straight into a consuming app's .env file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously only TOTP-enabled triggered an email. Every other
security-relevant change — password change, TOTP disable, passkey
add/remove, API key create/revoke, email address change, backup-code
regeneration — happened silently, so an attacker on a stolen session
could quietly drop 2FA or hijack the email with no signal to the
account holder.
Add SecurityMailer with one method per event. Each email carries the
request IP, user-agent, and timestamp so the user can spot unfamiliar
activity. Email-address changes notify both the old and new addresses
with directional language; the old-address copy explicitly warns that
whoever made the change can now receive password reset emails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both templates called `@user.password_reset_token` and
`@user.password_reset_token_expires_in`, which don't exist —
`generates_token_for` only adds class-level helpers, not instance
accessors. Every password reset email was failing at render time.
Use `generate_token_for(:password_reset)` and a literal expiry string
matching the 1-hour TTL on the token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The text part used non-existent helpers (`invite_url`,
`@user.invitation_login_token`) and Ruby string interpolation in an ERB
file, so multipart delivery failed at render time and no invite mail
went out. Mirror the HTML template instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
TOTP enrollment previously round-tripped the generated secret through a
hidden form field and saved whatever the client submitted, letting an
attacker with session access enroll a 2FA device they control by posting
their own secret plus a matching code. Stash the secret in the session
at GET /totp/new, read it only from the session at POST /totp, and drop
the hidden field from the view. Notify the user by email on successful
enrollment so unauthorized activations are visible even if a new vector
appears later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add "Remember me for 30 days" checkbox (30-day vs 24-hour session expiry)
- Center heading and constrain form width to max-w-md
- Preserve remember_me preference through TOTP and WebAuthn auth flows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Uses Tailwind v4 class-based dark mode with a Stimulus controller for
toggling. Respects prefers-color-scheme as default, prevents FOUC with
an inline script, and persists the user's choice in localStorage. All
views updated with dark: variants for backgrounds, text, borders,
badges, buttons, and form inputs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Install @tailwindcss/forms to fix missing padding on form inputs across
the app. Move the Application Type selector earlier in the new application
form (after slug, before description) so it gates type-specific fields
sooner. On the edit page, replace the confusing disabled dropdown with a
read-only badge since the type can't be changed after creation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add error target to login page so WebAuthn errors are visible instead
of only appearing in the console. Use a helpful fallback message that
suggests a browser extension may be interfering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a user has both passkeys and TOTP configured, auto-trigger the
passkey flow on login to save them from the password→TOTP path. Also
add a "Use Passkey Instead" button on the TOTP verification page as
an escape hatch for users who end up there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enables server-to-server authentication for forward auth applications
(e.g., video players accessing WebDAV) where browser cookies aren't
available. API keys use clk_ prefixed tokens stored as HMAC hashes.
Bearer token auth is checked before cookie auth in /api/verify.
Invalid tokens return 401 JSON (no redirect). Requests without
bearer tokens fall through to existing cookie flow unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
