An observed fa_token (via Referer leaks, access logs, JS monitors)
could previously be redeemed against a different reverse-proxied app
within the 60s TTL. The token now stores the destination host at
creation and the verifier rejects mismatches without burning the cache
entry, so legitimate destinations can still redeem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TOTP enrollment previously round-tripped the generated secret through a
hidden form field and saved whatever the client submitted, letting an
attacker with session access enroll a 2FA device they control by posting
their own secret plus a matching code. Stash the secret in the session
at GET /totp/new, read it only from the session at POST /totp, and drop
the hidden field from the view. Notify the user by email on successful
enrollment so unauthorized activations are visible even if a new vector
appears later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The FK added in b7fa499 defaulted to ON DELETE RESTRICT, which means
OidcTokenCleanupJob#perform would fail when deleting auth codes older
than 7 days if any refresh token (whose expiry is days-to-weeks) still
referenced them. Switch both token FKs to ON DELETE SET NULL so token
rows survive the code deletion with a NULL FK, preserving the audit
trail the cleanup job deliberately keeps.
Add a regression test covering the exact scenario: a 10-day-old auth
code with a token still pointing at it -> cleanup deletes the code,
token survives, token FK is nulled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The replay handler previously used a created_at time-range filter to
target access tokens and called update_all(expires_at:), which left
revoked_at nil, skipped refresh tokens entirely, and could miss or
falsely catch tokens from concurrent flows. Add an oidc_authorization_code
FK on both token tables, carry it through refresh-token rotation, and
use the association to revoke every descendant via revoke! (which sets
revoked_at and cascades access -> refresh).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove PKCE plain method support (S256 only), enforce openid scope requirement,
filter to supported scopes, strip reserved claims from custom claims as
defense-in-depth, sanitize SVG icons with Loofah, add global input padding,
switch session cookies to SameSite=Lax, use Session.active scope, and remove
unsafe-eval from CSP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Test ApplicationGroup cache busting on add and remove
- Test first failure persists in rate limit cache (increment fallback)
- Test bearer token failures count toward rate limit
- Test rd parameter rejected for deactivated applications
- Test last_activity_at updates after debounce window expires
- Test successful requests don't reset failure counter
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove duplicated app_allows_user_cached?/headers_for_user_cached methods; call model methods directly
- Fix sliding-window rate limit bug by using increment instead of write (avoids TTL reset)
- Use cached app lookup in validate_redirect_url instead of hitting DB on every unauthorized request
- Add cache busting to ApplicationGroup so group assignment changes invalidate the cache
- Eager-load user groups (includes(user: :groups)) to eliminate N+1 queries
- Replace pluck(:name) with map(&:name) to use already-loaded associations
- Remove hardcoded fallback domain, dead methods, and unnecessary comments
- Fix test indentation and make group-order assertions deterministic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rate limit failed attempts (50/min per IP) with 429 + Retry-After.
Cache forward auth applications in a dedicated MemoryStore (8MB LRU)
to avoid loading all apps from SQLite on every request. Debounce
last_activity_at writes to at most once per minute per session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace CGI.parse (removed in Ruby 4.0) with Rack::Utils.parse_query
in application controller, sessions controller, and OIDC tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enables server-to-server authentication for forward auth applications
(e.g., video players accessing WebDAV) where browser cookies aren't
available. API keys use clk_ prefixed tokens stored as HMAC hashes.
Bearer token auth is checked before cookie auth in /api/verify.
Invalid tokens return 401 JSON (no redirect). Requests without
bearer tokens fall through to existing cookie flow unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
