From c85d25c4b9e58e32ca1729b5f1f0c650aa29ef4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Milne Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:09:17 +1000 Subject: [PATCH] Untrack SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md and gitignore it Keep the findings tracker local-only; it should not be published. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 --- .gitignore | 3 ++ SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md | 110 ---------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 31df397..92c7d79 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -70,3 +70,6 @@ yarn-debug.log* # Ignore bootsnap cache /tmp/cache/bootsnap* + +# Local-only: do not publish the security findings tracker +SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md diff --git a/SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md b/SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md deleted file mode 100644 index e5de234..0000000 --- a/SECURITY_REVIEW_TODO.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ -# Security Review — Tracking - -Status of findings from the multi-surface security review (OIDC/OAuth2, ForwardAuth, -WebAuthn/TOTP, sessions, admin/config). Work landed on branch -`security/forward-auth-and-consent-csrf`. - -## ✅ Done (branch `security/forward-auth-and-consent-csrf`) - -All HIGH findings are closed. Each fix has tests; suite is green. - -| Commit | Fix | Sev | -|--------|-----|-----| -| `703d24e` | ForwardAuth fail-open when no host header; consent endpoint CSRF | HIGH ×2 | -| `8a095e4` | Bearer API-key skipped group check at use-time | HIGH | -| `96a657e` | Open redirect via unvalidated `X-Forwarded-Host` in login redirect | HIGH | -| `84ed462` | `CLINCH_HOST` made mandatory in deployed envs; dropped request-host fallback | MEDIUM | -| `f38ac2e` | TOTP code replay within drift window (+ latent plaintext backup-code bug) | HIGH | -| `406a79d` | SSRF via `backchannel_logout_uri` (metadata/loopback/RFC1918) | HIGH | -| `57d7d1f` | Host-auth regex unanchored (`evil-example.com` matched) | HIGH | -| `89bd5f1` | Disabled user could complete 2FA mid-flow / keep session; enforce active status | HIGH | -| `cd862c7` | TOTP/backup/OAuth/PKCE `code` params not filtered from logs | MEDIUM | -| `2426687` | `revoke_family!` didn't revoke access tokens on refresh-token reuse | HIGH | -| `44892e3` | WebAuthn clone detection logged but didn't block; false-positive on synced passkeys | HIGH | -| `d49e7ce` | CSP `unsafe-inline` removed (script-src + style-src → nonces) | HIGH | - -**Verified false positive (no change):** PKCE *is* required by default — -`require_pkce` column defaults to `true` (`db/schema.rb`), token endpoint enforces -it, admin UI exposes the opt-out. Operational check: confirm no legacy confidential -apps sit on `require_pkce = false`. - -**Follow-up before relying on CSP change:** do one manual browser pass (DevTools -console) on `/signin`, OAuth consent, a Turbo navigation, dark-mode toggle, and a -WebAuthn sign-in — expect zero CSP violations. Dev is report-only so violations -surface as warnings without breaking. Fallback if style-src surprises: keep -`style-src 'unsafe-inline'`, ship script-src only. - -## ☐ Remaining — MEDIUM - -- [ ] **`id_token_hint` ignored at OIDC logout** — any client can redirect logout to - any other registered client's post-logout URI. Validate the hint's `aud` and - scope the redirect to that app. `app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb` (logout). -- [ ] **`offline_access` doesn't gate refresh-token issuance** — refresh tokens are - minted unconditionally; gate on the granted scope. - `app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb` (authorization_code grant, ~line 564). -- [ ] **CSP-report endpoint hardening** — unauthenticated, no rate limit / body-size - cap, logs raw CRLF (log injection). Sanitize values, cap size, rate-limit. - `app/controllers/api/csp_controller.rb`. -- [ ] **Port not stripped from `X-Forwarded-Host`** in main verify + bearer paths → - 403 outages on non-standard ports (also a correctness bug). Reuse the - port-stripping done in `check_forward_auth_token`. - `app/controllers/api/forward_auth_controller.rb`. -- [ ] **WebAuthn `acr:"2"` without enforced user verification** — `user_verification: - "preferred"` lets a PIN-less key authenticate yet reports verified 2FA. Use - `"required"`, or downgrade `acr` to `"1"` when the UV flag is absent. - `app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb` (webauthn_challenge/verify), - `app/controllers/webauthn_controller.rb`. -- [ ] **`RESERVED_CLAIMS` incomplete** — missing `at_hash`/`auth_time`/`acr`; and - `ApplicationUserClaims` has no reserved-name validation (User/Group do). Could - let a custom claim overwrite a security claim. `app/services/oidc_jwt_service.rb`, - `app/models/application_user_claim.rb`. -- [ ] **`reset_session` not called on login** — defensive best practice for an IdP; - clears pre-auth session state. `app/controllers/concerns/authentication.rb` - (`start_new_session_for`). -- [x] **Hardcoded private IP `192.168.2.246`** in `config/environments/production.rb` - — removed; it was redundant with the `192.168.0.0/16` regex already in the - `CLINCH_ALLOW_INTERNAL_IPS` block. -- [ ] **CSP `form-action` widened by unvalidated `redirect_uri`** before auth — only - add to `form-action` if the client_id+redirect_uri is a registered pair. - `app/controllers/concerns/authentication.rb` (`allow_oauth_redirect_in_csp`). -- [ ] **SVG `style` attribute permits `url()`/`expression()`** — mitigated today by - `Content-Disposition: attachment`, but fragile. Sanitize CSS values or drop - `style` from the allowlist. `app/models/svg_scrubber.rb`. -- [ ] **WebAuthn error messages leak internals** — return generic errors to client, - log detail server-side. `app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb`, - `app/controllers/webauthn_controller.rb`. -- [ ] **Account enumeration via webauthn challenge** — distinguishes "user not found" - vs "no passkey". Return a uniform message. `app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb` - (`webauthn_challenge`). -- [ ] **`token_family_id` only 31 bits** (`SecureRandom.random_number(2**31)`) — - birthday collision ~46k; use a UUID/string. `app/models/oidc_refresh_token.rb`. -- [ ] **Session cookie uses sequential integer DB id** — HMAC-signed so not forgeable, - but consider a random `token` column (Rails 8 generator default). - `app/models/session.rb`, `app/controllers/concerns/authentication.rb`. -- [ ] **Login rate-limit is IP-only** — no account lockout (distributed brute force / - credential stuffing). Add failed-count + `locked_until` on users. -- [ ] **Backup-code rate limit not reset on success** and is cache-based (resets on - cache flush). Reset on success; consider DB-backed counter. `app/models/user.rb`. - -## ☐ Remaining — LOW / INFO - -- [ ] Public clients can't revoke their own tokens (revoke endpoint requires secret). -- [ ] Basic-auth client creds not URL-decoded per RFC 6749 §2.3.1. -- [ ] `token_hmac` columns nullable at DB level despite model `presence: true`. -- [ ] Group names allow commas → injection into `X-Remote-Groups` (false memberships - downstream). Add a format validator. `app/models/group.rb`. -- [ ] `fa_token` leaks in redirect URL / Referer / history (60s TTL, host-bound). -- [ ] Admin `domain_pattern` allows ReDoS — add a format validator. - `app/models/application.rb`. -- [ ] Forced-TOTP-setup login path can redirect-loop (`totp_required` + no TOTP). -- [ ] `complete_setup` creates an unprompted session for any authenticated user. -- [ ] Password min length only 8 — consider 12 + a max (bcrypt 72-byte truncation). -- [ ] `support_unencrypted_data: true` left enabled (TOTP secret encryption migration). - `config/initializers/active_record_encryption.rb`. -- [ ] All crypto keys derived from a single `SECRET_KEY_BASE` root — document setting - independent `ACTIVE_RECORD_ENCRYPTION_*` keys in production. -- [ ] Log injection via user `email_address` in ForwardAuth logs (strip CRLF / use - structured logging). `app/controllers/api/forward_auth_controller.rb`. -- [ ] WebAuthn RP ID is the registrable domain (cross-subdomain credential roaming) — - set `CLINCH_RP_ID` to the exact host unless roaming is intended. - `config/initializers/webauthn.rb`.