From 7149b98b7b6383ed94e50c4e4e17c0dcaacbd05d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Milne Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2026 12:30:02 +1000 Subject: [PATCH] Add OAuth device flow, token introspection, and dynamic client registration Adds three OAuth surfaces to the OIDC provider so CLIs, terminal agents, and MCP connectors can authenticate as real users instead of using static API keys. Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628): - OidcDeviceCode model (HMAC device_code, short plaintext user_code, nullable user until approval, slow_down polling state), mirroring OidcAuthorizationCode - POST /oauth/device_authorization issues the code pair + verification URIs - device_code grant on /oauth/token returns authorization_pending / slow_down / access_denied / expired_token, then the standard token triple; single-use - Authenticated /device approval page, gated by Application#user_allowed? Token Introspection (RFC 7662): - POST /oauth/introspect: confidential-caller-authenticated; returns active, scope, and the user's groups so resource servers can authorize on membership Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591): - POST /oauth/register creates public/confidential clients (PKCE required) - Runtime toggle via a new Setting store + admin switch on the Applications page; off by default, env var CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED as bootstrap fallback - New clients are default-deny (no allowed_groups) until an admin grants access - RFC 8414 metadata alias at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server; registration_endpoint advertised only while the window is open Discovery advertises all three grants/endpoints. Seeds add a clinch-cli public client and a c2a2-introspection confidential client. ADRs in docs/decisions record the opaque-vs-JWT, device-flow, and DCR-security decisions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F7cwhwDJp3MJJDoNPVE6zq --- .../dynamic_client_registration_controller.rb | 16 ++ .../device_authorizations_controller.rb | 88 ++++++ app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb | 255 +++++++++++++++++- .../oidc_registration_controller.rb | 141 ++++++++++ app/models/application.rb | 16 ++ app/models/oidc_device_code.rb | 110 ++++++++ app/models/setting.rb | 25 ++ app/views/admin/applications/index.html.erb | 24 ++ .../device_authorizations/result.html.erb | 43 +++ app/views/device_authorizations/show.html.erb | 88 ++++++ config/routes.rb | 13 + ...20260719000001_create_oidc_device_codes.rb | 43 +++ db/migrate/20260719000002_create_settings.rb | 12 + db/schema.rb | 36 ++- db/seeds.rb | 42 +++ .../0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md | 39 +++ .../0002-device-authorization-grant.md | 50 ++++ .../0003-dynamic-client-registration.md | 55 ++++ docs/decisions/README.md | 12 + .../oidc_device_flow_controller_test.rb | 231 ++++++++++++++++ .../oidc_registration_controller_test.rb | 137 ++++++++++ test/models/oidc_device_code_test.rb | 84 ++++++ 22 files changed, 1551 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 app/controllers/admin/dynamic_client_registration_controller.rb create mode 100644 app/controllers/device_authorizations_controller.rb create mode 100644 app/controllers/oidc_registration_controller.rb create mode 100644 app/models/oidc_device_code.rb create mode 100644 app/models/setting.rb create mode 100644 app/views/device_authorizations/result.html.erb create mode 100644 app/views/device_authorizations/show.html.erb create mode 100644 db/migrate/20260719000001_create_oidc_device_codes.rb create mode 100644 db/migrate/20260719000002_create_settings.rb create mode 100644 docs/decisions/0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md create mode 100644 docs/decisions/0002-device-authorization-grant.md create mode 100644 docs/decisions/0003-dynamic-client-registration.md create mode 100644 docs/decisions/README.md create mode 100644 test/controllers/oidc_device_flow_controller_test.rb create mode 100644 test/controllers/oidc_registration_controller_test.rb create mode 100644 test/models/oidc_device_code_test.rb diff --git a/app/controllers/admin/dynamic_client_registration_controller.rb b/app/controllers/admin/dynamic_client_registration_controller.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7db8cb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/controllers/admin/dynamic_client_registration_controller.rb @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +module Admin + # Toggles the RFC 7591 dynamic client registration window on/off at runtime. + class DynamicClientRegistrationController < BaseController + def update + enabled = ActiveModel::Type::Boolean.new.cast(params[:enabled]) + Setting.set(Application::DCR_SETTING_KEY, enabled) + + notice = if enabled + "Dynamic client registration enabled. New clients can self-register — attach them to a group, then disable this again." + else + "Dynamic client registration disabled." + end + redirect_to admin_applications_path, notice: notice + end + end +end diff --git a/app/controllers/device_authorizations_controller.rb b/app/controllers/device_authorizations_controller.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1958e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/controllers/device_authorizations_controller.rb @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +# User-facing side of the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628 §3.3). +# +# The CLI/agent sends the human here (GET /device) with the short user_code it +# was issued. This controller is authenticated, so an unauthenticated visitor is +# bounced through /signin (with their passkey) and returned here afterwards via +# session[:return_to_after_authenticating]. On POST /device the signed-in user +# approves or denies; approval attaches them to the device code and records +# consent so the token endpoint can mint tokens. +class DeviceAuthorizationsController < ApplicationController + # Browser form endpoint — keep CSRF protection on (do NOT skip it). + + # GET /device?user_code=WDJB-MJHT + def show + @user_code = params[:user_code].to_s + @device_code = OidcDeviceCode.find_by_user_code(@user_code) if @user_code.present? + + if @device_code.nil? + @state = @user_code.present? ? :not_found : :prompt + elsif @device_code.expired? + @state = :expired + elsif !@device_code.pending? + @state = :already_handled + else + @state = :confirm + @application = @device_code.application + @scopes = granted_scopes(@device_code) + end + + render :show + end + + # POST /device + def verify + @device_code = OidcDeviceCode.find_by_user_code(params[:user_code].to_s) + + if @device_code.nil? + @state = :not_found + return render :result + end + + if @device_code.expired? + @state = :expired + return render :result + end + + unless @device_code.pending? + @state = :already_handled + return render :result + end + + @application = @device_code.application + + if params[:deny].present? + @device_code.deny! + @state = :denied + return render :result + end + + # Enforce the same group-based access control as the OIDC authorize flow. + unless @application.user_allowed?(Current.user) + @state = :not_allowed + return render :result + end + + record_consent(@device_code, Current.user) + @device_code.approve!( + user: Current.user, + acr: Current.session.acr, + auth_time: Current.session.created_at.to_i + ) + @state = :approved + render :result + end + + private + + def granted_scopes(device_code) + device_code.scope.to_s.split & OidcController::SUPPORTED_SCOPES + end + + def record_consent(device_code, user) + consent = OidcUserConsent.find_or_initialize_by(user: user, application: device_code.application) + consent.scopes_granted = granted_scopes(device_code).join(" ") + consent.claims_requests = {} + consent.granted_at = Time.current + consent.save! + end +end diff --git a/app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb b/app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb index 4625b0c..8ec4e51 100644 --- a/app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb +++ b/app/controllers/oidc_controller.rb @@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController # Discovery and JWKS endpoints are public # authorize is also unauthenticated to handle prompt=none and prompt=login specially - allow_unauthenticated_access only: [:discovery, :jwks, :token, :revoke, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize] - # Machine-to-machine endpoints (token/revoke/userinfo) and pure redirect handlers - # (logout/authorize) legitimately skip CSRF. The consent endpoint is browser-facing - # and state-changing (it grants OAuth scopes), so it MUST keep CSRF protection — the - # consent form already embeds the token via form_with. - skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:token, :revoke, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize] + allow_unauthenticated_access only: [:discovery, :jwks, :token, :revoke, :introspect, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize, :device_authorization] + # Machine-to-machine endpoints (token/revoke/introspect/userinfo/device_authorization) + # and pure redirect handlers (logout/authorize) legitimately skip CSRF. The consent + # endpoint is browser-facing and state-changing (it grants OAuth scopes), so it MUST + # keep CSRF protection — the consent form already embeds the token via form_with. + skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:token, :revoke, :introspect, :userinfo, :logout, :authorize, :device_authorization] # RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1: client_id and redirect_uri must be validated *before* any # other error can be reported via redirect. Failures here render a plain page. @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController before_action :validate_redirect_uri, only: :authorize # Rate limiting to prevent brute force and abuse - rate_limit to: 60, within: 1.minute, only: [:token, :revoke], with: -> { + rate_limit to: 60, within: 1.minute, only: [:token, :revoke, :introspect, :device_authorization], with: -> { render json: {error: "too_many_requests", error_description: "Rate limit exceeded. Try again later."}, status: :too_many_requests } rate_limit to: 30, within: 1.minute, only: [:authorize, :consent], with: -> { @@ -32,12 +32,14 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController authorization_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/authorize", token_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/token", revocation_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/revoke", + introspection_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/introspect", userinfo_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/userinfo", + device_authorization_endpoint: "#{base_url}/oauth/device_authorization", jwks_uri: "#{base_url}/.well-known/jwks.json", end_session_endpoint: "#{base_url}/logout", response_types_supported: ["code"], response_modes_supported: ["query"], - grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code"], subject_types_supported: ["pairwise"], id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"], scopes_supported: SUPPORTED_SCOPES, @@ -60,6 +62,11 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController claims_parameter_supported: true } + # Only advertise dynamic client registration when it is enabled (RFC 7591). + if Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? + config[:registration_endpoint] = "#{base_url}/oauth/register" + end + render json: config end @@ -68,6 +75,55 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController render json: OidcJwtService.jwks end + # POST /oauth/device_authorization + # RFC 8628 §3.1-3.2 — Device Authorization Request/Response. + # Public (PKCE) client presents its client_id and gets back a device_code the + # client polls with, plus a short user_code the human types on the /device page. + def device_authorization + client_id, _client_secret = extract_client_credentials + application = Application.find_by(client_id: client_id, app_type: "oidc") + + unless application&.active? + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "Unknown or inactive client"}, status: :unauthorized + return + end + + # Only accept scopes we support (mirrors the authorize endpoint). + requested_scope = (params[:scope].to_s.split & SUPPORTED_SCOPES).join(" ") + requested_scope = "openid" if requested_scope.blank? + + # PKCE is optional but recommended for device flow (RFC 8628 §5.5). If the + # client sends a challenge here it must send the verifier at the token endpoint. + code_challenge = params[:code_challenge].presence + code_challenge_method = params[:code_challenge_method].presence + + if code_challenge_method.present? && code_challenge_method != "S256" + render json: {error: "invalid_request", error_description: "Only S256 code_challenge_method is supported"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + device_code = OidcDeviceCode.create!( + application: application, + scope: requested_scope, + nonce: params[:nonce].presence, + code_challenge: code_challenge, + code_challenge_method: code_challenge.present? ? (code_challenge_method || "S256") : nil + ) + + base_url = OidcJwtService.issuer_url + verification_uri = "#{base_url}/device" + + response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store" + render json: { + device_code: device_code.plaintext_device_code, + user_code: device_code.user_code, + verification_uri: verification_uri, + verification_uri_complete: "#{verification_uri}?user_code=#{device_code.user_code}", + expires_in: (device_code.expires_at - Time.current).to_i, + interval: device_code.interval + } + end + # GET /oauth/authorize def authorize # @application and a validated redirect_uri are guaranteed by the before_actions. @@ -453,11 +509,141 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController handle_authorization_code_grant when "refresh_token" handle_refresh_token_grant + when "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code" + handle_device_code_grant else render json: {error: "unsupported_grant_type"}, status: :bad_request end end + # RFC 8628 §3.4-3.5 — the CLI/agent polls here with its device_code until the + # user approves on the /device page, then receives the standard token triple. + def handle_device_code_grant + client_id, client_secret = extract_client_credentials + + unless client_id + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "client_id is required"}, status: :unauthorized + return + end + + application = Application.find_by(client_id: client_id) + unless application + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "Unknown client"}, status: :unauthorized + return + end + + # Public clients authenticate with the device_code (+ optional PKCE); a + # confidential client using device flow must still present its secret. + if application.confidential_client? + unless client_secret.present? && application.authenticate_client_secret(client_secret) + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "Invalid client credentials"}, status: :unauthorized + return + end + end + + unless application.active? + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "Application is not active"}, status: :forbidden + return + end + + device_code = OidcDeviceCode.find_by_plaintext_device_code(params[:device_code]) + unless device_code && device_code.application_id == application.id + render json: {error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "Invalid device_code"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + OidcDeviceCode.transaction do + # Lock so concurrent polls / a poll racing with approval can't double-issue. + device_code.lock! + + if device_code.expired? + render json: {error: "expired_token", error_description: "The device_code has expired"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + if device_code.denied? + render json: {error: "access_denied", error_description: "The authorization request was denied"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + if device_code.pending? + # Enforce the polling interval; too-frequent polls get slow_down, and the + # client is expected to add 5s to its interval (RFC 8628 §3.5). + if device_code.last_polled_at && (Time.current - device_code.last_polled_at) < device_code.interval + device_code.update!(interval: device_code.interval + 5, last_polled_at: Time.current) + render json: {error: "slow_down"}, status: :bad_request + else + device_code.update!(last_polled_at: Time.current) + render json: {error: "authorization_pending"}, status: :bad_request + end + return + end + + # Approved: mint tokens via the same path as the authorization code grant. + user = device_code.user + consent = OidcUserConsent.find_by(user: user, application: application) + unless consent + Rails.logger.error "OIDC Security: Device token requested without consent record (user: #{user&.id}, app: #{application.id})" + render json: {error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "Authorization consent not found"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + # PKCE is optional for device flow: only enforced when the device + # authorization request supplied a code_challenge. + if device_code.uses_pkce? + pkce_result = validate_pkce(application, device_code, params[:code_verifier]) + unless pkce_result[:valid] + render json: {error: pkce_result[:error], error_description: pkce_result[:error_description]}, status: pkce_result[:status] + return + end + end + + granted_scope = device_code.scope + + access_token_record = OidcAccessToken.create!( + application: application, + user: user, + scope: granted_scope + ) + + refresh_token_record = OidcRefreshToken.create!( + application: application, + user: user, + oidc_access_token: access_token_record, + scope: granted_scope, + auth_time: device_code.auth_time, + acr: device_code.acr + ) + + id_token = OidcJwtService.generate_id_token( + user, + application, + consent: consent, + nonce: device_code.nonce, + access_token: access_token_record.plaintext_token, + auth_time: device_code.auth_time, + acr: device_code.acr, + scopes: granted_scope, + claims_requests: {} + ) + + # Single-use: destroy the code so an approved device_code can't be replayed. + device_code.destroy! + + response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store" + response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache" + + render json: { + access_token: access_token_record.plaintext_token, + token_type: "Bearer", + expires_in: application.access_token_ttl || 3600, + id_token: id_token, + refresh_token: refresh_token_record.token, + scope: granted_scope + } + end + end + def handle_authorization_code_grant # Get client credentials from Authorization header or params client_id, client_secret = extract_client_credentials @@ -868,6 +1054,59 @@ class OidcController < ApplicationController render json: claims end + # POST /oauth/introspect + # RFC 7662 - OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection. + # A resource server (e.g. c2a2) presents an opaque access token and its own + # client credentials; we reply whether the token is active and, as an extension, + # the user's groups so the resource server can authorize on group membership. + def introspect + # RFC 7662 §2.1: the caller (resource server) MUST authenticate. Only a + # registered confidential client may introspect. + caller_id, caller_secret = extract_client_credentials + caller = Application.find_by(client_id: caller_id) if caller_id.present? + + unless caller&.confidential_client? && caller.active? && + caller_secret.present? && caller.authenticate_client_secret(caller_secret) + render json: {error: "invalid_client", error_description: "Caller authentication failed"}, status: :unauthorized + return + end + + token_value = params[:token] + if token_value.blank? + render json: {error: "invalid_request", error_description: "token parameter is required"}, status: :bad_request + return + end + + response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store" + response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache" + + access_token = OidcAccessToken.find_by_token(token_value) + + # Inactive/unknown/expired/revoked tokens (or those for a disabled app) are + # reported as simply inactive per RFC 7662 §2.2 — never an error. + unless access_token&.active? && access_token.application&.active? && access_token.user + render json: {active: false} + return + end + + user = access_token.user + application = access_token.application + consent = OidcUserConsent.find_by(user: user, application: application) + + render json: { + active: true, + scope: access_token.scope, + client_id: application.client_id, + token_type: "Bearer", + exp: access_token.expires_at.to_i, + iat: access_token.created_at.to_i, + sub: consent&.sid || user.id.to_s, + aud: application.client_id, + username: user.email_address, + groups: user.groups.pluck(:name) + } + end + # POST /oauth/revoke # RFC 7009 - Token Revocation def revoke diff --git a/app/controllers/oidc_registration_controller.rb b/app/controllers/oidc_registration_controller.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2aaaa26 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/controllers/oidc_registration_controller.rb @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +require "uri" + +# OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591). +# +# Lets a client (e.g. an MCP connector such as Claude) register itself instead of +# being hand-created in the admin UI. Gated by a runtime toggle +# (Application.dynamic_registration_enabled?) that defaults off. Registered +# clients are default-deny — they have no allowed_groups until an admin attaches +# one — so an anonymous registration cannot reach any user's data on its own. +class OidcRegistrationController < ApplicationController + allow_unauthenticated_access only: [:create] + skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:create] + + rate_limit to: 10, within: 1.minute, only: [:create], with: -> { + render json: {error: "too_many_requests", error_description: "Rate limit exceeded. Try again later."}, status: :too_many_requests + } + + AUTH_METHODS = %w[none client_secret_basic client_secret_post].freeze + SUPPORTED_GRANT_TYPES = %w[authorization_code refresh_token].freeze + SUPPORTED_RESPONSE_TYPES = %w[code].freeze + + # POST /oauth/register + def create + unless Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? + render json: {error: "access_denied", error_description: "Dynamic client registration is disabled"}, status: :forbidden + return + end + + metadata = parse_body + if metadata == :invalid + return register_error("invalid_client_metadata", "Request body must be a valid JSON object") + end + + auth_method = metadata["token_endpoint_auth_method"].presence || "client_secret_basic" + unless AUTH_METHODS.include?(auth_method) + return register_error("invalid_client_metadata", "Unsupported token_endpoint_auth_method") + end + + grant_types = Array(metadata["grant_types"].presence || ["authorization_code"]) + if (grant_types - SUPPORTED_GRANT_TYPES).any? + return register_error("invalid_client_metadata", "Unsupported grant_types; only #{SUPPORTED_GRANT_TYPES.join(", ")} are allowed") + end + + response_types = Array(metadata["response_types"].presence || ["code"]) + if (response_types - SUPPORTED_RESPONSE_TYPES).any? + return register_error("invalid_client_metadata", "Unsupported response_types; only 'code' is allowed") + end + + redirect_uris = Array(metadata["redirect_uris"]).map(&:to_s).reject(&:blank?) + if redirect_uris.empty? + return register_error("invalid_redirect_uri", "At least one redirect_uri is required") + end + invalid = redirect_uris.reject { |uri| valid_redirect_uri?(uri) } + if invalid.any? + return register_error("invalid_redirect_uri", "Invalid redirect_uri: #{invalid.first}") + end + + public_client = (auth_method == "none") + client_name = metadata["client_name"].to_s.strip.presence || "Dynamically Registered Client" + + application = Application.new( + name: client_name, + slug: unique_slug(client_name), + app_type: "oidc", + active: true, + # MCP / OAuth 2.1 expect PKCE; public clients require it automatically. + require_pkce: true, + is_public_client: public_client, + redirect_uris: redirect_uris.to_json, + metadata: registration_metadata(metadata, auth_method).to_json + ) + + unless application.save + return register_error("invalid_client_metadata", application.errors.full_messages.join("; ")) + end + + body = { + client_id: application.client_id, + client_id_issued_at: application.created_at.to_i, + redirect_uris: redirect_uris, + token_endpoint_auth_method: auth_method, + grant_types: grant_types, + response_types: response_types, + client_name: client_name + } + body[:scope] = metadata["scope"] if metadata["scope"].present? + + # Return the plaintext secret exactly once, for confidential clients. + if application.confidential_client? + body[:client_secret] = application.client_secret + body[:client_secret_expires_at] = 0 # never expires + end + + response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store" + response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache" + render json: body, status: :created + end + + private + + def parse_body + parsed = JSON.parse(request.raw_post) + parsed.is_a?(Hash) ? parsed : :invalid + rescue JSON::ParserError + :invalid + end + + def register_error(error, description) + render json: {error: error, error_description: description}, status: :bad_request + end + + # RFC 7591 allows https everywhere and http only for loopback (native apps). + def valid_redirect_uri?(uri) + parsed = URI.parse(uri) + return false unless parsed.is_a?(URI::HTTP) # covers HTTP and HTTPS + return true if parsed.scheme == "https" + %w[localhost 127.0.0.1 ::1].include?(parsed.host) + rescue URI::InvalidURIError + false + end + + def unique_slug(name) + base = name.parameterize.presence || "client" + "#{base.first(40)}-#{SecureRandom.hex(6)}" + end + + # Preserve the descriptive metadata the client sent for later reference in the + # admin UI, without letting it drive access. + def registration_metadata(metadata, auth_method) + { + "dynamically_registered" => true, + "token_endpoint_auth_method" => auth_method, + "client_uri" => metadata["client_uri"], + "logo_uri" => metadata["logo_uri"], + "contacts" => metadata["contacts"], + "policy_uri" => metadata["policy_uri"], + "tos_uri" => metadata["tos_uri"], + "scope" => metadata["scope"] + }.compact + end +end diff --git a/app/models/application.rb b/app/models/application.rb index 3932d81..ba96aa9 100644 --- a/app/models/application.rb +++ b/app/models/application.rb @@ -103,6 +103,22 @@ class Application < ApplicationRecord app_type == "forward_auth" end + DCR_SETTING_KEY = "dynamic_client_registration".freeze + + # OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591) is opt-in: it lets anyone + # anonymously create an OIDC client, so it is disabled by default. An admin + # toggles it at runtime (open the window, let a client self-register, attach it + # to a group, close the window again). Newly registered clients are still + # default-deny (no allowed_groups) until an admin grants access. + # + # The persisted Setting is authoritative once set; until then we fall back to + # the CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED env var (bootstrap/headless default, off if unset). + def self.dynamic_registration_enabled? + stored = Setting.boolean(DCR_SETTING_KEY) + return stored unless stored.nil? + ActiveModel::Type::Boolean.new.cast(ENV["CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED"]) + end + # Client type checks (for OIDC) def public_client? client_secret_digest.blank? diff --git a/app/models/oidc_device_code.rb b/app/models/oidc_device_code.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1caa7ce --- /dev/null +++ b/app/models/oidc_device_code.rb @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +# OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant code (RFC 8628). +# +# Mirrors OidcAuthorizationCode: the long device_code is opaque and stored as an +# HMAC, while the short user_code is stored in plaintext because the user types it +# back on the verification page. A record is created "pending" by the device +# authorization endpoint, moved to "approved" (with a user) or "denied" on the +# verification page, and consumed by the token endpoint once approved. +class OidcDeviceCode < ApplicationRecord + belongs_to :application + belongs_to :user, optional: true # nil until the request is approved + + # Alphabet for the user_code: uppercase letters + digits, minus visually + # ambiguous characters (0/O, 1/I, etc.) so it is easy to read and type. + USER_CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789".chars.freeze + USER_CODE_GROUP_SIZE = 4 + USER_CODE_GROUPS = 2 # e.g. "WDJB-MJHT" + + STATUSES = %w[pending approved denied].freeze + + attr_accessor :plaintext_device_code + + before_validation :generate_device_code, on: :create + before_validation :generate_user_code, on: :create + before_validation :set_expiry, on: :create + + validates :device_code_hmac, presence: true, uniqueness: true + validates :user_code, presence: true, uniqueness: true + validates :status, inclusion: {in: STATUSES} + validates :code_challenge_method, inclusion: {in: %w[S256], allow_nil: true} + validate :validate_code_challenge_format, if: -> { code_challenge.present? } + + scope :valid, -> { where(status: "pending").where("expires_at > ?", Time.current) } + scope :expired, -> { where("expires_at <= ?", Time.current) } + + # Find a device code by its plaintext device_code using HMAC verification. + def self.find_by_plaintext_device_code(plaintext_device_code) + return nil if plaintext_device_code.blank? + + find_by(device_code_hmac: compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code)) + end + + # Look up a device code by the human-typed user_code. Normalizes case and + # strips separators/whitespace so "wdjb-mjht" and "WDJB MJHT" both match. + def self.find_by_user_code(user_code) + return nil if user_code.blank? + + find_by(user_code: normalize_user_code(user_code)) + end + + def self.normalize_user_code(user_code) + user_code.to_s.upcase.gsub(/[^A-Z0-9]/, "") + end + + def self.compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code) + OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest("SHA256", TokenHmac::KEY, plaintext_device_code) + end + + def expired? + expires_at <= Time.current + end + + def pending? + status == "pending" + end + + def approved? + status == "approved" + end + + def denied? + status == "denied" + end + + def uses_pkce? + code_challenge.present? + end + + # Grant the request: attach the approving user and capture their auth context. + def approve!(user:, acr:, auth_time:) + update!(status: "approved", user: user, acr: acr, auth_time: auth_time) + end + + def deny! + update!(status: "denied") + end + + private + + def generate_device_code + self.plaintext_device_code ||= SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(48) + self.device_code_hmac ||= self.class.compute_device_code_hmac(plaintext_device_code) + end + + def generate_user_code + self.user_code ||= USER_CODE_GROUPS.times.map do + USER_CODE_GROUP_SIZE.times.map { USER_CODE_ALPHABET.sample }.join + end.join + end + + def set_expiry + self.expires_at ||= 10.minutes.from_now + end + + def validate_code_challenge_format + # PKCE code challenge should be base64url-encoded, 43-128 characters. + unless code_challenge.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43,128}\z/) + errors.add(:code_challenge, "must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding") + end + end +end diff --git a/app/models/setting.rb b/app/models/setting.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d154ed --- /dev/null +++ b/app/models/setting.rb @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# Small persisted key/value store for runtime-togglable configuration that an +# admin can flip from the UI without a redeploy (e.g. the dynamic client +# registration window). Values are stored as strings; use the typed helpers. +class Setting < ApplicationRecord + validates :key, presence: true, uniqueness: true + + def self.get(key) + find_by(key: key.to_s)&.value + end + + def self.set(key, value) + record = find_or_initialize_by(key: key.to_s) + record.value = value.to_s + record.save! + value + end + + # Returns nil if the key has never been set, so callers can distinguish + # "unset" (fall back to a default) from an explicit false. + def self.boolean(key) + raw = get(key) + return nil if raw.nil? + ActiveModel::Type::Boolean.new.cast(raw) + end +end diff --git a/app/views/admin/applications/index.html.erb b/app/views/admin/applications/index.html.erb index ba2a383..36ce827 100644 --- a/app/views/admin/applications/index.html.erb +++ b/app/views/admin/applications/index.html.erb @@ -23,6 +23,30 @@ +<% dcr_on = Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? %> +
"> +
+

+ Dynamic client registration + "> + <%= dcr_on ? "On" : "Off" %> + +

+

+ <% if dcr_on %> + Clients can self-register via POST /oauth/register (RFC 7591). New clients get no access until you attach a group. Disable this once your client is connected. + <% else %> + New clients must be created here. Enable briefly to let a client (e.g. an MCP connector) register itself, then disable again. + <% end %> +

+
+ <%= button_to dcr_on ? "Disable" : "Enable", + admin_dynamic_client_registration_path, + method: :patch, + params: {enabled: !dcr_on}, + class: "shrink-0 rounded-md px-3 py-2 text-sm font-semibold text-white shadow-sm #{dcr_on ? "bg-amber-600 hover:bg-amber-500" : "bg-blue-600 hover:bg-blue-500"}" %> +
+
diff --git a/app/views/device_authorizations/result.html.erb b/app/views/device_authorizations/result.html.erb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..237a567 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/views/device_authorizations/result.html.erb @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +
+
+ <% case @state %> + <% when :approved %> + + + +

Device approved

+

+ <%= @application.name %> now has access to your account. You can return to your + terminal — it will continue automatically. You may close this tab. +

+ + <% when :denied %> + + + +

Request denied

+

+ No access was granted. You can close this tab. +

+ + <% when :not_allowed %> + + + +

Access not allowed

+

+ Your account isn't a member of a group permitted to use <%= @application.name %>. + Contact an administrator if you think this is a mistake. +

+ + <% else %> +

+ <%= @state == :expired ? "Code expired" : (@state == :already_handled ? "Code already used" : "Code not found") %> +

+

+ Start again from your tool to get a fresh code. +

+ <%= link_to "Enter a different code", device_verification_path, class: "mt-6 inline-block text-sm font-medium text-blue-600 hover:text-blue-500 dark:text-blue-400" %> + <% end %> +
+
diff --git a/app/views/device_authorizations/show.html.erb b/app/views/device_authorizations/show.html.erb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..154486e --- /dev/null +++ b/app/views/device_authorizations/show.html.erb @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +
+
+ <% case @state %> + <% when :confirm %> +
+ <% if @application.icon.attached? %> +
+ <%= app_icon_picture @application, class: "mx-auto h-20 w-20 rounded-xl object-cover border-2 border-gray-200 dark:border-gray-700 shadow-sm" %> +
+ <% else %> +
+ <%= render "shared/app_monogram", name: @application.name, class: "h-20 w-20 rounded-xl shadow-sm" %> +
+ <% end %> +

Authorize device

+

+ <%= @application.name %> is requesting access to your account from a device or command line. +

+
+ +
+

Code shown on your device

+

<%= @device_code.user_code %>

+

Only approve if this matches the code your tool is showing.

+
+ + <% if @scopes.any? %> +
+

This will be able to:

+
    + <% scope_labels = { "openid" => "Verify your identity", "email" => "Access your email address (#{Current.user.email_address})", "profile" => "Access your profile information", "groups" => "Access your group memberships", "offline_access" => "Stay signed in (refresh access)" } %> + <% @scopes.each do |scope| %> +
  • + + + + <%= scope_labels[scope] || scope %> +
    • + <% end %> +
+
+ <% end %> + + <%= form_with url: device_verification_path, method: :post, class: "space-y-3", data: { turbo: false }, local: true do |form| %> + <%= form.hidden_field :user_code, value: @device_code.user_code %> + <%= form.submit "Approve", + class: "w-full flex justify-center py-2 px-4 border border-transparent rounded-md shadow-sm text-sm font-medium text-white bg-blue-600 hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-offset-2 dark:focus:ring-offset-gray-900 focus:ring-blue-500" %> + <%= button_tag "Deny", + type: :submit, + name: :deny, + value: "1", + class: "w-full flex justify-center py-2 px-4 border border-gray-300 dark:border-gray-600 rounded-md shadow-sm text-sm font-medium text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-200 bg-white dark:bg-gray-700 dark:ring-gray-600 hover:bg-gray-50 dark:hover:bg-gray-800 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-offset-2 dark:focus:ring-offset-gray-900 focus:ring-blue-500" %> + <% end %> + + <% when :prompt %> +
+

Enter device code

+

Type the code shown by your tool or command line.

+
+ <%= form_with url: device_verification_path, method: :get, class: "space-y-4", data: { turbo: false }, local: true do |form| %> + <%= form.text_field :user_code, + autofocus: true, + autocomplete: "off", + placeholder: "WDJB-MJHT", + class: "block w-full text-center font-mono text-xl tracking-widest uppercase rounded-md border-gray-300 dark:border-gray-600 dark:bg-gray-700 dark:text-gray-100 shadow-sm focus:border-blue-500 focus:ring-blue-500" %> + <%= form.submit "Continue", + class: "w-full flex justify-center py-2 px-4 border border-transparent rounded-md shadow-sm text-sm font-medium text-white bg-blue-600 hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-offset-2 dark:focus:ring-offset-gray-900 focus:ring-blue-500" %> + <% end %> + + <% else %> +
+

+ <%= @state == :expired ? "Code expired" : (@state == :already_handled ? "Code already used" : "Code not found") %> +

+

+ <% if @state == :expired %> + This device code has expired. Start again from your tool to get a fresh code. + <% elsif @state == :already_handled %> + This device code has already been approved or denied. Start again from your tool if you need a new one. + <% else %> + We couldn't find that code. Check the code your tool is showing and try again. + <% end %> +

+ <%= link_to "Enter a different code", device_verification_path, class: "mt-6 inline-block text-sm font-medium text-blue-600 hover:text-blue-500 dark:text-blue-400" %> +
+ <% end %> +
+
diff --git a/config/routes.rb b/config/routes.rb index 1fc6759..eca4d5c 100644 --- a/config/routes.rb +++ b/config/routes.rb @@ -25,14 +25,25 @@ Rails.application.routes.draw do # OIDC (OpenID Connect) routes get "/.well-known/openid-configuration", to: "oidc#discovery" + # RFC 8414 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata (alias of OIDC discovery; + # MCP clients look here). OIDC discovery is a superset of the RFC 8414 fields. + get "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", to: "oidc#discovery" get "/.well-known/jwks.json", to: "oidc#jwks" + # RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration + post "/oauth/register", to: "oidc_registration#create" match "/oauth/authorize", to: "oidc#authorize", via: [:get, :post] post "/oauth/authorize/consent", to: "oidc#consent", as: :oauth_consent post "/oauth/token", to: "oidc#token" post "/oauth/revoke", to: "oidc#revoke" + post "/oauth/introspect", to: "oidc#introspect" match "/oauth/userinfo", to: "oidc#userinfo", via: [:get, :post] get "/logout", to: "oidc#logout" + # OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) + post "/oauth/device_authorization", to: "oidc#device_authorization" + get "/device", to: "device_authorizations#show", as: :device_verification + post "/device", to: "device_authorizations#verify" + # ForwardAuth / Trusted Header SSO namespace :api do get "/verify", to: "forward_auth#verify" @@ -96,6 +107,8 @@ Rails.application.routes.draw do end resources :groups get "access", to: "access_checks#new" + # Runtime toggle for the RFC 7591 dynamic client registration window. + resource :dynamic_client_registration, only: [:update], controller: "dynamic_client_registration" end # Render dynamic PWA files from app/views/pwa/* (remember to link manifest in application.html.erb) diff --git a/db/migrate/20260719000001_create_oidc_device_codes.rb b/db/migrate/20260719000001_create_oidc_device_codes.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e008a46 --- /dev/null +++ b/db/migrate/20260719000001_create_oidc_device_codes.rb @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +class CreateOidcDeviceCodes < ActiveRecord::Migration[8.1] + def change + create_table :oidc_device_codes do |t| + t.references :application, null: false, foreign_key: true + # user_id is nullable: it stays blank while the code is pending and is + # filled in when the user approves the request on the verification page. + t.references :user, null: true, foreign_key: true + + # Opaque device_code, stored as an HMAC (never plaintext) — matches the + # OidcAuthorizationCode pattern. + t.string :device_code_hmac, null: false + # Short, human-typable code the user enters on the verification page. + # Stored in plaintext because the user reads it off one screen and types + # it into another; kept safe by short expiry + single use + rate limiting. + t.string :user_code, null: false + + t.string :status, null: false, default: "pending" # pending / approved / denied + + t.string :scope + t.string :nonce + + # PKCE (RFC 8628 permits and recommends PKCE for public clients). + t.string :code_challenge + t.string :code_challenge_method + + # Captured at approval time from the approving user's session. + t.string :acr + t.integer :auth_time + + t.datetime :expires_at, null: false + # Timestamp of the last token-endpoint poll, used to enforce the polling + # interval and emit slow_down (RFC 8628 §3.5). + t.datetime :last_polled_at + t.integer :interval, null: false, default: 5 + + t.timestamps + end + + add_index :oidc_device_codes, :device_code_hmac, unique: true + add_index :oidc_device_codes, :user_code, unique: true + add_index :oidc_device_codes, :expires_at + end +end diff --git a/db/migrate/20260719000002_create_settings.rb b/db/migrate/20260719000002_create_settings.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ebef61f --- /dev/null +++ b/db/migrate/20260719000002_create_settings.rb @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +class CreateSettings < ActiveRecord::Migration[8.1] + def change + create_table :settings do |t| + t.string :key, null: false + t.string :value + + t.timestamps + end + + add_index :settings, :key, unique: true + end +end diff --git a/db/schema.rb b/db/schema.rb index 129980c..38dbe99 100644 --- a/db/schema.rb +++ b/db/schema.rb @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ # # It's strongly recommended that you check this file into your version control system. -ActiveRecord::Schema[8.1].define(version: 2026_06_11_000001) do +ActiveRecord::Schema[8.1].define(version: 2026_07_19_000002) do create_table "active_storage_attachments", force: :cascade do |t| t.bigint "blob_id", null: false t.datetime "created_at", null: false @@ -161,6 +161,30 @@ ActiveRecord::Schema[8.1].define(version: 2026_06_11_000001) do t.index ["user_id"], name: "index_oidc_authorization_codes_on_user_id" end + create_table "oidc_device_codes", force: :cascade do |t| + t.string "acr" + t.integer "application_id", null: false + t.integer "auth_time" + t.string "code_challenge" + t.string "code_challenge_method" + t.datetime "created_at", null: false + t.string "device_code_hmac", null: false + t.datetime "expires_at", null: false + t.integer "interval", default: 5, null: false + t.datetime "last_polled_at" + t.string "nonce" + t.string "scope" + t.string "status", default: "pending", null: false + t.datetime "updated_at", null: false + t.string "user_code", null: false + t.integer "user_id" + t.index ["application_id"], name: "index_oidc_device_codes_on_application_id" + t.index ["device_code_hmac"], name: "index_oidc_device_codes_on_device_code_hmac", unique: true + t.index ["expires_at"], name: "index_oidc_device_codes_on_expires_at" + t.index ["user_code"], name: "index_oidc_device_codes_on_user_code", unique: true + t.index ["user_id"], name: "index_oidc_device_codes_on_user_id" + end + create_table "oidc_refresh_tokens", force: :cascade do |t| t.string "acr" t.integer "application_id", null: false @@ -218,6 +242,14 @@ ActiveRecord::Schema[8.1].define(version: 2026_06_11_000001) do t.index ["user_id"], name: "index_sessions_on_user_id" end + create_table "settings", force: :cascade do |t| + t.datetime "created_at", null: false + t.string "key", null: false + t.datetime "updated_at", null: false + t.string "value" + t.index ["key"], name: "index_settings_on_key", unique: true + end + create_table "user_groups", force: :cascade do |t| t.datetime "created_at", null: false t.integer "group_id", null: false @@ -286,6 +318,8 @@ ActiveRecord::Schema[8.1].define(version: 2026_06_11_000001) do add_foreign_key "oidc_access_tokens", "users" add_foreign_key "oidc_authorization_codes", "applications" add_foreign_key "oidc_authorization_codes", "users" + add_foreign_key "oidc_device_codes", "applications" + add_foreign_key "oidc_device_codes", "users" add_foreign_key "oidc_refresh_tokens", "applications" add_foreign_key "oidc_refresh_tokens", "oidc_access_tokens" add_foreign_key "oidc_refresh_tokens", "oidc_authorization_codes", on_delete: :nullify diff --git a/db/seeds.rb b/db/seeds.rb index 4fbd6ed..3c308d4 100644 --- a/db/seeds.rb +++ b/db/seeds.rb @@ -7,3 +7,45 @@ # ["Action", "Comedy", "Drama", "Horror"].each do |genre_name| # MovieGenre.find_or_create_by!(name: genre_name) # end + +# --- OAuth clients for CLI / agent access and token introspection --------------- +# +# These support the Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) and RFC 7662 token +# introspection. See docs/decisions/0002-device-authorization-grant.md. + +admins = Group.find_by(admin: true) + +# Public client (no secret, PKCE) used by CLIs and agents via the device flow. +# Ships with a well-known client_id so tools can hard-code it. +cli = Application.find_or_create_by!(client_id: "clinch-cli") do |app| + app.name = "Clinch CLI" + app.slug = "clinch-cli" + app.app_type = "oidc" + app.is_public_client = true + app.active = true +end + +# Grant the CLI to the admins group by default (device flow enforces +# Application#user_allowed?). Adjust to taste. +if admins && cli.allowed_groups.exclude?(admins) + cli.allowed_groups << admins + puts "Seeded 'clinch-cli' public client (allowed group: #{admins.name})." +end + +# Confidential client that resource servers (e.g. c2a2) use to authenticate to +# the introspection endpoint. The secret is only shown once, on creation. +unless Application.exists?(client_id: "c2a2-introspection") + secret = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(48) + Application.create!( + name: "c2a2 (introspection caller)", + slug: "c2a2-introspection", + client_id: "c2a2-introspection", + client_secret: secret, + app_type: "oidc", + active: true + ) + puts "Seeded 'c2a2-introspection' confidential client:" + puts " client_id: c2a2-introspection" + puts " client_secret: #{secret}" + puts " Store these in c2a2 now — the secret is hashed and cannot be recovered." +end diff --git a/docs/decisions/0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md b/docs/decisions/0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06b76c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/decisions/0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# 0001 — Opaque access tokens (not JWT); introspection for resource servers + +**Status:** Accepted · **Date:** 2026-07-19 + +## Decision + +Clinch issues **opaque** access and refresh tokens — random strings stored server-side +as SHA-256 HMACs (`OidcAccessToken` / `OidcRefreshToken`), not self-contained JWTs. The +**ID token stays a JWT** (RS256), because it is meant to be read by the client. Resource +servers that need to validate an access token call the **RFC 7662 introspection endpoint** +(`POST /oauth/introspect`), which also returns the user's `groups` for authorization. + +## Context + +There is no universal winner between opaque and JWT access tokens; it is an architecture +call: + +| | Opaque (reference) | JWT (self-contained) | +|---|---|---| +| Validation | Resource server calls back (introspect/userinfo) | Offline signature check against JWKS | +| **Revocation** | **Instant** — the AS holds the state | Valid until expiry unless a blocklist is added (which re-adds state) | +| Best when | One central IdP, few resource servers, revocation matters | Many resource servers, high throughput, offline verification needed | +| Token contents | Nothing leaks (just a handle) | Claims readable by any holder | + +Clinch is a single self-hosted IdP with a handful of relying parties. It already has +instant revocation, including refresh-token **family revocation** on reuse. That +revocation guarantee is a real security property for an IdP, and the introspection +callback cost is negligible at this scale (and cacheable by the resource server). + +## Consequences + +- Resource servers (e.g. c2a2) cannot verify tokens offline; they must call + `/oauth/introspect` (authenticated as a confidential client) and should briefly cache + positive results. +- Tokens can be revoked immediately (logout, admin action, reuse detection) and stop + working at the next introspection — a property JWT access tokens can't offer without + reintroducing server state. +- If we ever need many resource servers with zero-latency offline verification, revisit + with RFC 9068 (JWT access token profile) — accepting the loss of instant revocation. diff --git a/docs/decisions/0002-device-authorization-grant.md b/docs/decisions/0002-device-authorization-grant.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73eebd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/decisions/0002-device-authorization-grant.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# 0002 — CLI/agent auth via the Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) + +**Status:** Accepted · **Date:** 2026-07-19 + +## Decision + +CLIs and terminal agents (e.g. Claude) authenticate to Clinch-protected services as a +real user via the **OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628)** instead of static +API keys. The tool prints a short code and a URL; the user approves at `/device` with +their passkey; the tool polls the token endpoint and receives the standard +access + refresh + ID token triple. + +## Context + +We wanted CLIs — and especially headless agents — to authenticate as a real user rather +than carry a long-lived API key. The two mainstream options: + +- **Device flow (RFC 8628):** tool prints a code, human approves on any device, tool + polls. Needs only "print text" + "poll HTTP". +- **Auth code + PKCE with a loopback (`127.0.0.1`) redirect (RFC 8252):** tool opens a + browser and catches a local redirect. + +Agents are often sandboxed or run on a remote box where opening a browser and receiving a +loopback redirect is unreliable. Device flow needs neither, which is exactly why it fits +CLIs and agents. The human approves wherever their passkey lives. + +## Implementation notes + +- `OidcDeviceCode` mirrors `OidcAuthorizationCode`: opaque `device_code` stored as an + HMAC, short plaintext `user_code`, nullable `user` until approval, `status` + (pending/approved/denied), PKCE columns, and `interval`/`last_polled_at` for + `slow_down` enforcement. +- Endpoints: `POST /oauth/device_authorization`, the + `urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code` branch of `POST /oauth/token`, and the + authenticated verification page `GET/POST /device`. +- Token issuance reuses the authorization-code path (`OidcAccessToken` + + `OidcRefreshToken` + `OidcJwtService`). Access control reuses + `Application#user_allowed?`, so approval is gated by group membership. +- PKCE is **optional** for device flow (RFC 8628 §5.5): enforced only when the device + authorization request supplied a `code_challenge`. The `device_code` itself is a + high-entropy secret delivered directly to the client over TLS. +- A well-known public client `clinch-cli` (no secret, PKCE) is seeded for tools to use. + +## Consequences + +- No static API keys for user-context CLI/agent access; tokens are revocable and expire. +- Resource servers validate the resulting opaque access tokens via introspection — see + [0001](0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md). +- Same foundation (public clients + PKCE + introspection) supports future MCP connector + support, whose main additional piece would be Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591). diff --git a/docs/decisions/0003-dynamic-client-registration.md b/docs/decisions/0003-dynamic-client-registration.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4fd298 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/decisions/0003-dynamic-client-registration.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# 0003 — Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), runtime-gated + +**Status:** Accepted · **Date:** 2026-07-19 + +## Decision + +Clinch supports **OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)** at +`POST /oauth/register`, so clients (notably MCP connectors like Claude) can register +themselves instead of being hand-created. It is **off by default** and toggled at runtime +by an admin from the Applications page. A newly registered client is **default-deny**: it +has no `allowed_groups` until an admin attaches one. + +We also serve the **RFC 8414** metadata alias at +`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` (the OIDC discovery document is a superset), and +advertise `registration_endpoint` only while registration is enabled. + +## Context + +MCP connectors expect to self-register via anonymous DCR rather than being pre-provisioned. +But open registration is a real risk: anyone could register a legitimate-looking client and +attempt **consent phishing** — luring a user to approve it, then holding a token that acts +as that user against any resource server that trusts clinch tokens (via introspection, see +[0001](0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md)). + +Two controls make this safe: + +1. **Runtime window, not always-on.** DCR is a toggle (persisted `Setting`, admin UI), so + the operator opens it briefly, lets the client register, attaches a group, and closes it + again. The `CLINCH_DCR_ENABLED` env var is only a bootstrap default when the setting is + unset. Default is off. +2. **Default-deny for new clients.** Clinch's authorize flow already gates on + `Application#user_allowed?` (group membership), evaluated *before* the consent screen + renders. A group-less registered client therefore can't show any user an approve button — + the consent-phishing path dead-ends until an admin explicitly grants a group. ForwardAuth + services are gated by the user's session cookie, not client tokens, so DCR doesn't widen + that surface at all. + +## Implementation notes + +- `OidcRegistrationController#create`: validates `token_endpoint_auth_method` + (none/client_secret_basic/client_secret_post), `grant_types` + (authorization_code/refresh_token), `response_types` (code), and `redirect_uris` + (https anywhere; http only for loopback). Creates a public or confidential `Application` + with `require_pkce: true`, returns the RFC 7591 response (client_secret once, for + confidential clients). +- `Setting` is a small key/value store; `Application.dynamic_registration_enabled?` reads it + with the env var as fallback. Admin toggle: `Admin::DynamicClientRegistrationController`. + +## Consequences + +- MCP connectors can self-register when the window is open, then operate normally once an + admin grants a group. +- No always-on anonymous registration surface; the risky window is short and operator-driven. +- Remaining MCP pieces (resource indicators RFC 8707, protected-resource metadata RFC 9728 on + the resource server) are separate, smaller follow-ups. diff --git a/docs/decisions/README.md b/docs/decisions/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cfd92c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/decisions/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# Architecture Decision Records + +Short, dated records of non-obvious technical decisions in Clinch. They live in the +repo (rather than a wiki) so they version with the code and travel with a checkout. + +Each file is one decision. Newest decisions get the next number. + +| # | Decision | +|---|----------| +| [0001](0001-opaque-vs-jwt-access-tokens.md) | Access tokens are opaque (not JWT); resource servers use introspection | +| [0002](0002-device-authorization-grant.md) | CLI/agent auth uses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) | +| [0003](0003-dynamic-client-registration.md) | Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), runtime-gated + default-deny | diff --git a/test/controllers/oidc_device_flow_controller_test.rb b/test/controllers/oidc_device_flow_controller_test.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a79dfef --- /dev/null +++ b/test/controllers/oidc_device_flow_controller_test.rb @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +require "test_helper" + +class OidcDeviceFlowControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest + DEVICE_GRANT = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code".freeze + + def setup + @group = Group.create!(name: "device-flow-testers", description: "test") + @user = User.create!(email_address: "device_flow@example.com", password: "password123") + @user.groups << @group + + @cli = Application.create!( + name: "Device Flow CLI", + slug: "device-flow-cli", + app_type: "oidc", + is_public_client: true, + active: true + ) + @cli.allowed_groups << @group + + @resource_secret = "resource-server-secret-value-1234567890" + @resource = Application.create!( + name: "Device Flow Resource Server", + slug: "device-flow-rs", + app_type: "oidc", + client_secret: @resource_secret, + active: true + ) + end + + def teardown + Current.session = nil + [@cli, @resource].each do |app| + OidcRefreshToken.where(application: app).delete_all + OidcAccessToken.where(application: app).delete_all + OidcDeviceCode.where(application: app).delete_all + OidcUserConsent.where(application: app).delete_all + end + end + + # --- Discovery ------------------------------------------------------------- + + test "discovery advertises the device grant and new endpoints" do + get "/.well-known/openid-configuration" + assert_response :success + config = JSON.parse(@response.body) + + assert_includes config["grant_types_supported"], DEVICE_GRANT + assert config["device_authorization_endpoint"].end_with?("/oauth/device_authorization") + assert config["introspection_endpoint"].end_with?("/oauth/introspect") + end + + # --- Device authorization endpoint ----------------------------------------- + + test "device_authorization issues a device_code and user_code" do + post "/oauth/device_authorization", params: {client_id: @cli.client_id, scope: "openid groups"} + assert_response :success + body = JSON.parse(@response.body) + + assert body["device_code"].present? + assert_match(/\A[A-HJ-NP-Z2-9]{8}\z/, body["user_code"]) + assert body["verification_uri"].end_with?("/device") + assert body["verification_uri_complete"].include?("user_code=#{body["user_code"]}") + assert_equal 5, body["interval"] + assert body["expires_in"].positive? + end + + test "device_authorization rejects an unknown client" do + post "/oauth/device_authorization", params: {client_id: "does-not-exist"} + assert_response :unauthorized + assert_equal "invalid_client", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + # --- Token endpoint device_code grant -------------------------------------- + + test "token endpoint returns authorization_pending while pending" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + poll(dc) + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "authorization_pending", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "token endpoint returns slow_down when polled faster than the interval" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + poll(dc) # first poll records last_polled_at + poll(dc) # immediate second poll is too fast + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "slow_down", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "token endpoint returns expired_token for an expired code" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid", expires_at: 1.minute.ago) + poll(dc) + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "expired_token", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "token endpoint returns access_denied when the user denied" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + dc.deny! + poll(dc) + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "access_denied", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "token endpoint issues tokens once approved, then the code is single-use" do + OidcUserConsent.create!(user: @user, application: @cli, scopes_granted: "openid groups", granted_at: Time.current) + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid groups") + dc.approve!(user: @user, acr: "1", auth_time: Time.current.to_i) + + poll(dc) + assert_response :success + body = JSON.parse(@response.body) + assert body["access_token"].present? + assert body["refresh_token"].present? + assert body["id_token"].present? + assert_equal "Bearer", body["token_type"] + assert_equal "openid groups", body["scope"] + + # Replaying the (now consumed) device_code fails. + poll(dc) + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "invalid_grant", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + # --- Verification page ----------------------------------------------------- + + test "verification page shows the approval prompt for a signed-in allowed user" do + sign_in_as(@user) + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid groups") + + get "/device", params: {user_code: dc.user_code} + assert_response :success + assert_match(/Approve/, @response.body) + assert_match(dc.user_code, @response.body) + end + + test "approving records consent and approves the device code" do + sign_in_as(@user) + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid groups") + + post "/device", params: {user_code: dc.user_code} + assert_response :success + assert_match(/approved/i, @response.body) + + dc.reload + assert dc.approved? + assert_equal @user, dc.user + assert OidcUserConsent.exists?(user: @user, application: @cli) + end + + test "denying marks the device code denied" do + sign_in_as(@user) + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + + post "/device", params: {user_code: dc.user_code, deny: "1"} + assert_response :success + dc.reload + assert dc.denied? + end + + test "a user without access cannot approve" do + outsider = User.create!(email_address: "outsider@example.com", password: "password123") + sign_in_as(outsider) + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + + post "/device", params: {user_code: dc.user_code} + assert_response :success + assert_match(/not allowed/i, @response.body) + dc.reload + assert dc.pending?, "device code must stay pending when approval is refused" + end + + test "verification page requires authentication" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @cli, scope: "openid") + get "/device", params: {user_code: dc.user_code} + assert_redirected_to signin_path + end + + # --- Introspection --------------------------------------------------------- + + test "introspection reports an active token with groups" do + token = OidcAccessToken.create!(application: @cli, user: @user, scope: "openid groups") + + post "/oauth/introspect", params: { + token: token.plaintext_token, + client_id: @resource.client_id, + client_secret: @resource_secret + } + assert_response :success + body = JSON.parse(@response.body) + + assert_equal true, body["active"] + assert_equal @cli.client_id, body["client_id"] + assert_includes body["groups"], @group.name + assert body["sub"].present? + end + + test "introspection reports inactive for a revoked token" do + token = OidcAccessToken.create!(application: @cli, user: @user, scope: "openid") + token.revoke! + + post "/oauth/introspect", params: { + token: token.plaintext_token, + client_id: @resource.client_id, + client_secret: @resource_secret + } + assert_response :success + assert_equal false, JSON.parse(@response.body)["active"] + end + + test "introspection requires valid caller credentials" do + token = OidcAccessToken.create!(application: @cli, user: @user, scope: "openid") + + post "/oauth/introspect", params: { + token: token.plaintext_token, + client_id: @resource.client_id, + client_secret: "wrong-secret" + } + assert_response :unauthorized + end + + private + + def poll(device_code) + post "/oauth/token", params: { + grant_type: DEVICE_GRANT, + device_code: device_code.plaintext_device_code, + client_id: @cli.client_id + } + end +end diff --git a/test/controllers/oidc_registration_controller_test.rb b/test/controllers/oidc_registration_controller_test.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a793410 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/controllers/oidc_registration_controller_test.rb @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +require "test_helper" + +class OidcRegistrationControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest + JSON_HEADERS = {"Content-Type" => "application/json"}.freeze + + def teardown + Setting.where(key: Application::DCR_SETTING_KEY).delete_all + Application.where("slug LIKE ?", "%-%").where(metadata: nil).delete_all + Application.where("metadata LIKE ?", "%dynamically_registered%").destroy_all + end + + def enable_dcr + Setting.set(Application::DCR_SETTING_KEY, true) + end + + def register(body) + post "/oauth/register", params: body.to_json, headers: JSON_HEADERS + end + + test "registration is disabled by default" do + register(redirect_uris: ["https://client.example.com/cb"], token_endpoint_auth_method: "none") + assert_response :forbidden + assert_equal "access_denied", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "registers a public client and returns no secret" do + enable_dcr + register( + redirect_uris: ["https://client.example.com/cb"], + token_endpoint_auth_method: "none", + grant_types: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + client_name: "My MCP Connector" + ) + + assert_response :created + body = JSON.parse(@response.body) + assert body["client_id"].present? + assert_not body.key?("client_secret") + assert_equal ["https://client.example.com/cb"], body["redirect_uris"] + assert_equal "none", body["token_endpoint_auth_method"] + + app = Application.find_by(client_id: body["client_id"]) + assert app.public_client? + assert app.require_pkce? + assert_empty app.allowed_groups, "a freshly registered client must be default-deny" + end + + test "registers a confidential client and returns a secret once" do + enable_dcr + register( + redirect_uris: ["https://client.example.com/cb"], + token_endpoint_auth_method: "client_secret_basic" + ) + + assert_response :created + body = JSON.parse(@response.body) + assert body["client_secret"].present? + assert_equal 0, body["client_secret_expires_at"] + + app = Application.find_by(client_id: body["client_id"]) + assert app.confidential_client? + assert app.authenticate_client_secret(body["client_secret"]) + end + + test "requires at least one redirect_uri" do + enable_dcr + register(token_endpoint_auth_method: "none") + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "invalid_redirect_uri", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "rejects non-loopback http redirect_uris" do + enable_dcr + register(redirect_uris: ["http://evil.example.com/cb"], token_endpoint_auth_method: "none") + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "invalid_redirect_uri", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "allows http redirect_uris for loopback" do + enable_dcr + register(redirect_uris: ["http://localhost:8123/cb"], token_endpoint_auth_method: "none") + assert_response :created + end + + test "rejects unsupported grant types" do + enable_dcr + register(redirect_uris: ["https://client.example.com/cb"], grant_types: ["client_credentials"]) + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "invalid_client_metadata", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + test "rejects a non-JSON body" do + enable_dcr + post "/oauth/register", params: "not json", headers: JSON_HEADERS + assert_response :bad_request + assert_equal "invalid_client_metadata", JSON.parse(@response.body)["error"] + end + + # --- Discovery advertisement ---------------------------------------------- + + test "discovery advertises registration_endpoint only when enabled" do + get "/.well-known/openid-configuration" + assert_not JSON.parse(@response.body).key?("registration_endpoint") + + enable_dcr + get "/.well-known/openid-configuration" + assert JSON.parse(@response.body)["registration_endpoint"].end_with?("/oauth/register") + end + + test "RFC 8414 metadata alias mirrors OIDC discovery" do + get "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server" + assert_response :success + config = JSON.parse(@response.body) + assert config["token_endpoint"].end_with?("/oauth/token") + assert config["authorization_endpoint"].end_with?("/oauth/authorize") + end + + # --- Admin runtime toggle -------------------------------------------------- + + test "admin can toggle the registration window at runtime" do + sign_in_as(users(:alice)) # alice is in the admin group + + patch "/admin/dynamic_client_registration", params: {enabled: "true"} + assert_redirected_to admin_applications_path + assert Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? + + patch "/admin/dynamic_client_registration", params: {enabled: "false"} + assert_not Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? + end + + test "non-admins cannot toggle registration" do + sign_in_as(users(:one)) # not an admin + patch "/admin/dynamic_client_registration", params: {enabled: "true"} + assert_redirected_to root_path + assert_not Application.dynamic_registration_enabled? + end +end diff --git a/test/models/oidc_device_code_test.rb b/test/models/oidc_device_code_test.rb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5edf5cf --- /dev/null +++ b/test/models/oidc_device_code_test.rb @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +require "test_helper" + +class OidcDeviceCodeTest < ActiveSupport::TestCase + def setup + @application = Application.create!( + name: "Device Code Model Test", + slug: "device-code-model-test", + app_type: "oidc", + is_public_client: true, + active: true + ) + @user = User.create!(email_address: "device_model@example.com", password: "password123") + end + + test "generates an opaque device_code stored as HMAC and looked up by plaintext" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + + assert dc.plaintext_device_code.present? + assert dc.device_code_hmac.present? + assert_not_equal dc.plaintext_device_code, dc.device_code_hmac + assert_equal dc, OidcDeviceCode.find_by_plaintext_device_code(dc.plaintext_device_code) + assert_nil OidcDeviceCode.find_by_plaintext_device_code("wrong") + end + + test "generates a short user_code from the unambiguous alphabet" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + + assert_equal 8, dc.user_code.length + # No visually ambiguous characters (0/O, 1/I) and only the allowed alphabet. + assert_match(/\A[A-HJ-NP-Z2-9]{8}\z/, dc.user_code) + end + + test "find_by_user_code normalizes case, hyphens, and whitespace" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + formatted = "#{dc.user_code[0, 4]}-#{dc.user_code[4, 4]}".downcase + + assert_equal dc, OidcDeviceCode.find_by_user_code(formatted) + assert_equal dc, OidcDeviceCode.find_by_user_code(" #{dc.user_code} ") + assert_nil OidcDeviceCode.find_by_user_code("nope") + end + + test "user_code is unique" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + dup = OidcDeviceCode.new(application: @application, user_code: dc.user_code) + + assert_not dup.valid? + assert_includes dup.errors[:user_code], "has already been taken" + end + + test "starts pending and approve! attaches the user and auth context" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + assert dc.pending? + + dc.approve!(user: @user, acr: "1", auth_time: 1_700_000_000) + + assert dc.approved? + assert_equal @user, dc.user + assert_equal "1", dc.acr + assert_equal 1_700_000_000, dc.auth_time + end + + test "deny! marks the code denied" do + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application) + dc.deny! + assert dc.denied? + end + + test "expired? reflects expires_at" do + assert OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application, expires_at: 1.minute.ago).expired? + assert_not OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application).expired? + end + + test "uses_pkce? and rejects malformed code_challenge" do + assert_not OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application).uses_pkce? + + valid_challenge = "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM" + dc = OidcDeviceCode.create!(application: @application, code_challenge: valid_challenge, code_challenge_method: "S256") + assert dc.uses_pkce? + + bad = OidcDeviceCode.new(application: @application, code_challenge: "too-short") + assert_not bad.valid? + assert_includes bad.errors[:code_challenge], "must be 43-128 characters of base64url encoding" + end +end