Make WebAuthn clone detection actually block, and fix false positives
Two problems with sign-count clone detection: - suspicious_sign_count? flagged the case where both the stored and presented counts are 0. Most synced passkeys (Apple/Google) report 0 every time, so every legitimate sign-in was flagged — drowning real signals in noise. Per WebAuthn §6.1.1 a 0 counter means "no counter"; only flag when BOTH counts are non-zero and the new one does not advance. - On a suspicious count the controller only logged a warning and then continued to authenticate and overwrite the stored counter. A cloned credential therefore worked indefinitely. webauthn_verify now rejects the sign-in (no session, no counter update) and emails the user via a new SecurityMailer#suspicious_passkey_used. Tests cover the corrected classification (synced/first-use/normal vs equal/ decreasing) and the new alert email. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -52,13 +52,17 @@ class WebauthnCredential < ApplicationRecord
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end
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end
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# Check if sign count is suspicious (clone detection)
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# Check if sign count is suspicious (clone detection).
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#
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# Per WebAuthn §6.1.1, a signature counter of 0 means the authenticator does
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# not implement a counter (true of most synced passkeys — Apple/Google report
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# 0 every time), so it cannot be used for clone detection. Only when BOTH the
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# stored and presented counts are non-zero does a non-increasing value signal
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# a possible clone.
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def suspicious_sign_count?(new_sign_count)
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return false if sign_count.zero? && new_sign_count > 0 # First use
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return false if new_sign_count > sign_count # Normal increment
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return false if sign_count.zero? || new_sign_count.zero?
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# Sign count didn't increase - possible clone
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true
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new_sign_count <= sign_count
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end
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# Format for display in UI
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