Bind forward-auth fa_token to its destination host

An observed fa_token (via Referer leaks, access logs, JS monitors)
could previously be redeemed against a different reverse-proxied app
within the 60s TTL. The token now stores the destination host at
creation and the verifier rejects mismatches without burning the cache
entry, so legitimate destinations can still redeem.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Milne
2026-04-20 19:04:53 +10:00
parent 7f0d3d3900
commit 2d5650e620
3 changed files with 168 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@@ -163,16 +163,25 @@ module Api
def check_forward_auth_token
token = params[:fa_token]
return nil unless token.present?
return nil if token.blank?
session_id = Rails.cache.read("forward_auth_token:#{token}")
return nil unless session_id
cached = Rails.cache.read("forward_auth_token:#{token}")
return nil unless cached.is_a?(Hash)
session = Session.find_by(id: session_id)
# The token is bound to the host that created it. If the request is
# arriving at a different host, refuse — and do NOT burn the cache
# entry, so that the legitimate destination can still redeem within
# the 60s TTL.
request_host = (request.headers["X-Forwarded-Host"] || request.headers["Host"])
.to_s.sub(/:\d+\z/, "").downcase
return nil if request_host.blank?
return nil unless cached[:host] == request_host
session = Session.find_by(id: cached[:session_id])
return nil unless session && !session.expired?
Rails.cache.delete("forward_auth_token:#{token}")
session_id
cached[:session_id]
end
def extract_session_id

View File

@@ -130,35 +130,35 @@ module Authentication
end
# Create a one-time token for forward auth to handle the race condition
# where the browser hasn't processed the session cookie yet
# where the browser hasn't processed the session cookie yet.
#
# The token is bound to the destination host so that anyone who observes
# the token (Referer leaks, access logs, JS monitors) cannot redeem it for
# a different application within the 60-second TTL.
def create_forward_auth_token(session_obj)
# Generate a secure random token
token = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
controller_session = session
return unless controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating].present?
# Store it with an expiry of 60 seconds
uri = URI.parse(controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating])
# OAuth flow handles its own session propagation — no fa_token needed.
return if uri.path&.start_with?("/oauth/")
# Path-only URLs are same-origin on Clinch; the cookie race doesn't apply
# and we have no destination host to bind against.
bound_host = uri.hostname&.downcase
return if bound_host.blank?
token = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
Rails.cache.write(
"forward_auth_token:#{token}",
session_obj.id,
{ session_id: session_obj.id, host: bound_host },
expires_in: 60.seconds
)
# Set the token as a query parameter on the redirect URL
# We need to store this in the controller's session
controller_session = session
if controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating].present?
original_url = controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating]
uri = URI.parse(original_url)
# Skip adding fa_token for OAuth URLs (OAuth flow should not have forward auth tokens)
unless uri.path&.start_with?("/oauth/")
# Add token as query parameter
query_params = URI.decode_www_form(uri.query || "").to_h
query_params["fa_token"] = token
uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(query_params)
# Update the session with the tokenized URL
controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = uri.to_s
end
end
query_params = URI.decode_www_form(uri.query || "").to_h
query_params["fa_token"] = token
uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(query_params)
controller_session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = uri.to_s
end
end